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From Treaties to International
Commitments: The Changing Landscape of
Foreign Relations Law
Jean Galbraith†
Sometimes the United States makes international commitments in the manner
set forth in the Treaty Clause. But far more often it uses congressional-executive
agreements, sole executive agreements, and soft-law commitments. Scholars of foreign relations law typically approach these other processes from the perspective of
constitutional law, seeking to determine the extent to which they are constitutionally
permissible. In contrast, this Article situates the myriad ways in which the United
States enters into international commitments as the product not only of constitutional law, but also of international law and administrative law. Drawing on all
three strands of law provides a rich understanding of the various processes for making international commitments and of the circumstances under which a particular
process will be used. This approach also has important implications for separationof-powers concerns. From a constitutional-law perspective, the rise of international
commitments outside the Treaty Clause registers as an unvarnished increase in
presidential power. Factoring in international law and administrative law reveals
a far more nuanced reality. While direct congressional checks on presidential power
have weakened, alternative checks have arisen from administrative agencies, the international legal structure, and even to some degree from US states. This Article
describes the reconfigured landscape of checks and balances, which are spread
across the negotiation, domestic approval, and implementation of international
commitments. It then offers a qualified normative defense of this system and proposes several structural and doctrinal improvements. The Article closes with a case
study applying its approach to the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
In his farewell address, George Washington urged that “[t]he
great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is . . . to
have with them as little political connection as possible.”1 This
advice illustrates just how wide a gap exists between the world of
the Founders and the present day. No longer a small nation struggling for respect, the United States now does not and could not
manage its affairs in the absence of strong international cooperation. It has countless ongoing international commitments and
continues to pursue new ones.2 During the Obama administration, the United States joined the New START treaty on arms
1
George Washington, Farewell Address of Sept 17, 1796, in James D. Richardson,
ed, 1 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 205, 214 (Bureau of National Literature 1897).
2
Because this Article focuses on how the United States participates in international
commitments, all references to “international commitments,” “international agreements,”
and “treaties” refer to those involving the United States (unless otherwise specified). I use
“international commitments” broadly to cover formalized exchanges of promises by the
United States and one or more other nations, regardless of whether these promises are
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control, the Basel III accords on international financial regulation, the Iran deal regarding nuclear nonproliferation, the
Paris Agreement addressing climate change, and numerous
lower-profile commitments. The Trump administration is more
skeptical of international cooperation and has already announced its intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Yet
it too may well end up making or revising at least some important commitments.3
A striking feature of these international commitments is the
diversity of legal pathways by which the United States joins
them. The Treaty Clause of the Constitution empowers the president to make treaties with the advice and consent of two-thirds
of the Senate.4 This is the only way to enter into international
commitments that is specified in the Constitution, and yet today
international commitments are routinely reached in other ways.
Of the four commitments named above, only one—the New
START treaty—has gone through the process set out in the
Treaty Clause.5 The others have all followed different paths.
Basel III is nonbinding as a matter of international law and is
being implemented by administrative agencies through powers
delegated to them under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act6 and preexisting statutes.7 The Iran
deal is also nonbinding as a matter of international law, and the
executive branch can meet the US commitments under it by deploying previously delegated statutory authority.8 The Paris
Agreement is binding under international law and took effect
without any specific congressional approval, although the Obama
administration intended to tie its implementation to previously
binding under international law. I use “international agreements” more narrowly to refer
to instruments that contain commitments that are binding as a matter of international
law. I use “treaties” still more narrowly to refer to agreements that go through the process
set out in the Treaty Clause.
3
See Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Signing the “Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, Aug
2, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Q9TG-P5HT (stating that “[a]s President, I can make
far better deals with foreign countries than Congress”).
4
US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
5
See Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to the New START Treaty with the
Russian Federation, 111th Cong, 2d Sess, in 156 Cong Rec 23472 (Dec 22, 2010).
6
Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010).
7
See Jean Galbraith and David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 Cornell L Rev 735, 784–87 (2014).
8
See Jack Goldsmith, Why Congress Is Effectively Powerless to Stop the Iran Deal
(and Why the Answer Is Not the Iran Review Act) (Lawfare, July 20, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/GB4U-SC5A.
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delegated administrative authority.9 A fifth major agreement negotiated by the Obama administration—the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP)—would have required approval and implementation by congressional legislation but has since been abandoned by the Trump administration.10 Collectively, these examples illustrate that the US process for making international
commitments has become multifaceted rather than unitary.
Scholars of foreign relations law typically break down US
participation in international agreements into three main categories: treaties entered into pursuant to the Treaty Clause,
congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements.11 Congressional-executive agreements “are concluded by
the president with either the advance authorization or subsequent approval of a majority of both houses of Congress.”12 Sole
executive agreements “are concluded by the president alone.”13
This three-part categorization is long-standing—dating back at
least to the 1920s—and has become “Lesson I of Foreign Relations
Law 101.”14 Yet its usefulness is increasingly questionable. In a
speech given during his tenure as State Department Legal Adviser, Professor Harold Koh criticized this framework as a “procrustean construct,” observing that international agreements often “do not fall neatly into any of these boxes.”15 This three-part
categorization also takes account only of agreements that are
9
See Senior State Department Official on the Paris Agreement Signing Ceremony
(US Department of State, Apr 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/VK2Y-JWMD; Juliet
Eilperin, Obama Hails ‘Historic’ Ratification of Paris Climate Agreement (Wash Post, Oct
5, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/JKY8-FE2R.
10 See Statement by the President on the Signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(White House Office of the Press Secretary, Feb 3, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/J5BY
-34N5; Presidential Memorandum regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement (White House Office of the Press
Secretary, Jan 23, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/6FCM-A36J.
11 For coverage in leading treatises, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, International Law in the US Legal System 31–95 (Oxford 2013); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs
and the United States Constitution 175–224 (Oxford 2d ed 1996); Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 303 (1987). In these and other sources,
there are several variations on the overall terminology—for example, sole executive agreements are sometimes called presidential agreements, and congressional-executive agreements and sole executive agreements are sometimes collectively referred to as executive
agreements. An additional category, which scholars frequently note but tend to treat more
briefly, is that of agreements entered into by the executive branch that are authorized by
a preexisting treaty.
12 Bradley, International Law at 75 (cited in note 11).
13 Id.
14 Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks: Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking,
101 Georgetown L J 725, 726 (2013). For the origins of the categorization, see Part I.A.
15 Id at 727, 732.
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binding under international law and thus does not cover purely
nonbinding commitments, even those as important as Basel III or
the Iran deal.
The emphasis on these three categories is problematic for a
deeper reason, as well. It frames the process of making international commitments using the lens of constitutional law. The very
names “congressional-executive agreements” and “sole executive
agreements” evoke Articles I and II, and most scholarship engaging with these categories has focused on the extent to which the
Constitution permits their use.16 But as important and foundational as this constitutional question indisputably is, there are
other questions that one should ask, including: How does the
United States decide which form of international commitment it
will use? And what structural checks and balances operate in the
current system? Answering these questions from a constitutionallaw perspective will at best give rise to only partial answers, and
at worst may give rise to misleading ones.
This Article explores the multiple pathways available for
making international commitments. To understand the structural landscape in which they exist, we must take into account
three strands of law—not just constitutional law, but also international law and administrative law. Each strand plays a crucial
role in shaping how the United States makes international commitments. The structure of the international legal system both
encourages the use of multiple pathways and affects what pathways are available in particular contexts. Constitutional law
places meaningful doctrinal limits on the available pathways,
although these limits now have more force with regard to how international commitments are implemented than with regard to
how they are made in the first place. Perhaps most significantly,
administrative law influences the choice of pathways by affecting
how international commitments can be implemented, by underlying the State Department’s internal process for determining

16 See, for example, Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future
of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale L J 1236, 1338–49 (2008);
Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 Va L Rev 1573, 1578–
1617, 1654–60 (2007); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional
Method, 79 Tex L Rev 961, 964–1009 (2001); Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements
and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 NC L Rev 133, 160–83, 218–35 (1998); David M. Golove,
Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 NYU L Rev 1791, 1798–1805 (1998); Laurence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 Harv L Rev 1221, 1228–35 (1995); Bruce Ackerman and David Golove,
Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv L Rev 799, 808–13 (1995).
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which pathway to pursue in a given context, and by shaping who
is at the negotiating table for the United States.
This approach has important implications for separation-ofpowers concerns. From the vantage point of constitutional law,
the rise of myriad paths for making international commitments
amounts to an unvarnished win for presidential power. The president has the power to choose which pathway to domestic approval to pursue for an international commitment, conditional on
the use of this pathway being deemed constitutional. The more
constitutionally permissible options there are, the more the president can evade the democratic and deliberative check of legislative review. As the Obama administration increasingly favored
bypassing the subsequent approval of the Senate or Congress for
international commitments, claims of presidential unilateralism
followed quickly. “That’s outrageous, and it’s unlawful. And it’s a
clear example of the executive overreach in the area of foreign
affairs,” said the convener of a congressional hearing on the administration’s decision to join the Paris Agreement without going
to the Senate.17
When all three strands of law are taken into account, the
structural landscape looks quite different. For international law
and administrative law have also given rise to constraints on
presidential power. These constraints are ones that the Framers
did not foresee, and yet they further James Madison’s goal of “contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the
means of keeping each other in their proper places.”18 These constraints arise at all stages of an international commitment—negotiation, domestic approval, and implementation. Some of these
constraints are independent of the constitutional constraints, but
others have their strongest bite at times when the constitutional
constraints are the weakest. In other words, the more the president seeks to bypass the Senate and Congress, the more he or she
is likely to run up not only against constitutional concerns, but
also against alternative constraints arising from international
and administrative law and from institutions empowered by these

17 Executive Overreach in Foreign Affairs, Hearing before the Executive Overreach
Task Force of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 114th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (2016) (“House
Executive Overreach Task Force Hearing”) (statement of Rep King).
18 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 347–48 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E.
Cooke, ed).
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bodies of law—including international organizations, administrative agencies, and occasionally even US states. The president’s
power with respect to international commitments is thus not the
power to avoid constraints entirely. Rather, it is the power to
choose between different types of constraints.
The Paris Agreement exemplifies the structural claims made
in this Article. From the perspective of constitutional limits on
the approval process, it was a textbook example of unchecked
presidential power. It was also a signature foreign policy achievement of President Barack Obama: in his words, a “historic” and
“ambitious” agreement that will “establish[ ] the enduring framework the world needs to solve the climate crisis.”19 Yet while his
predecessors accepted the need to take the two prior major multilateral agreements on climate to the Senate, Obama joined the
United States to the Paris Agreement without seeking specific
legislative approval—and did this precisely because such approval would not have been forthcoming.
From a broader perspective, however, the Paris Agreement
reveals constraint upon constraint. Partly to avoid constitutional
issues related to approval, the Obama administration had to accept strong checks in relation to the Agreement’s negotiation and
implementation. In the negotiations, the executive branch had to
operate within the limits arising from the international legal process, including a requirement of consensus, and yet persuade
other nations to craft an agreement that satisfied its constitutional concerns. This process was so fraught that even in the final
moments the negotiations almost broke down over a single word.20
During these negotiations, the executive branch also had to ensure that the resulting agreement could be implemented domestically through authority previously delegated by the Clean Air
Act21 to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
states. This in turn required US negotiators to tie their negotiating position to the scope of the Clean Air Act, to involve the EPA
in the negotiating process, and to pay close attention to underlying principles of administrative law and federalism. And as
challenging as the negotiation of the Paris Agreement was for US
19 Statement by the President on the Paris Climate Agreement (White House Office of
the Press Secretary, Dec 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A75H-DL3M.
20 Joby Warrick, How One Word Nearly Killed the Climate Deal (Wash Post, Dec 13,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2JBX-98DU.
21 See Clean Air Act, Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392 (1963), codified as amended at 42
USC § 7401 et seq; Clear Air Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676; Clear
Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub L No 95-95, 91 Stat 685.
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negotiators, its future presents even more difficulties. President
Donald Trump has already announced that he intends to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, although this
may not be his final word on the subject.22 And even if the United
States were to remain in the Paris Agreement, there would still
be much to be worked out both internationally through the process that governs further negotiations and domestically in terms
of practical implementation. Overall, the story of the Paris
Agreement illustrates both the reach and the limits of the president’s power to make international commitments.
This Article’s descriptive account of the current system for
making international commitments stands apart from the desirability of this system from a normative perspective. On the normative question, this Article goes on to offer a qualified defense
of the current system. This system strikes a reasonable balance
between two related problems of our contemporary governmental
landscape: presidential overreaching and legislative inaction. As
to presidential overreaching, it incorporates a set of constraints
that reduce the risks of abuses of power. As to legislative inaction,
it provides the executive branch with alternatives to obtaining
specific approval from the Senate or Congress, while folding in
alternative forms of democratic accountability. In general, the rise
of the current system is broadly faithful to other developments
within public law, including the way in which administrative-law
values have come to complement and sometimes substitute for
constitutional principles.
The normative claims of this Article, if accepted, in turn have
implications for several ongoing structural and doctrinal debates
within the field of foreign relations law. One implication is that
we should resist calls for sweeping changes to the process of how
the executive branch makes international commitments,
although some refinements would be beneficial. A second is that
the Senate and Congress would do well to reduce the barriers to
specific legislative approval that currently exist in order to give
the executive branch more incentives to pursue traditional paths
to approval. A third implication is that courts should be cautious
22 Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (White House Office
of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/6GZ7-GJXP. But see
Madeline Conway, Trump: ‘Something Could Happen’ on Paris Agreement (Politico, July
13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/5STQ-6TYX (describing Trump’s statement in a
press conference that “something could happen with respect to the Paris accord. We’ll
see what happens. . . . And if it happens, that will be wonderful, and if it doesn’t, that
will be OK, too”).
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in crediting certain strong claims of presidential power, including
claims that the president and his or her agents have exclusive
power to communicate with foreign governmental actors and
claims that international commitments made solely by the executive branch have the power to preempt state law.
The rest of the Article develops the arguments summarized
above. Part I describes how constitutional law, international law,
and administrative law each contribute to the reconfigured landscape of international commitments. Part II explores the role that
presidential power plays under this framework and discusses the
rise of a diffuse yet robust set of checks on this power. Part III
offers a qualified defense of the existing system and proposes several doctrinal improvements. Finally, Part IV illustrates the
claims made in this Article through a case study of the Paris
Agreement.
Two caveats to this Article require particular mention. First,
in describing international law and administrative law as sources
of growing checks on presidential power, this Article does not seek
to imply that they operate in the same way or to the same degree.
As a general matter, international law tends to operate more as
an independent check on presidential power, and administrative
law tends to operate more as a substitute for constitutional
checks—but both the strength of these checks and their degree of
interconnection to constitutional checks are highly dependent on
context. Second, this Article focuses on describing and evaluating
the current landscape rather than on dating its various features.
The origins of alternatives to the Treaty Clause lie deep in our
constitutional history, and modern international and administrative law began to influence the process by which the United States
joins international commitments by at least the end of World
War II. Regardless of whether the choices made by the Obama
administration are characterized as incremental developments or
seismic shifts, they illustrate the importance of all three strands
of law for the process by which the United States joins international commitments. That administration’s commitment to global
engagement, the partisan gridlock in Congress, and the increased
importance of international regulatory cooperation together put
international commitments made without the explicit approval of
the Senate or Congress at the center of US foreign policy.
Looking ahead, the template created by the Obama administration may not get much use during the Trump administration.
To date, Trump appears more focused on undoing international
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commitments than on making new ones—and his actions make
clear to the international community just how fragile international commitments made without the Senate or Congress can be.
But it is early in his term, and the creation or revision of other
international commitments may lie ahead of him. Still further
ahead, future presidents interested in pursuing international cooperation will likely find the precedents from the Obama administration to be compelling, especially as legislative approval for
international commitments will remain difficult to get in the absence of structural reforms. The international commitments of
the Obama administration thus merit close scrutiny not only on
their own account but also for the future.
I. INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND THREE STRANDS OF LAW
How should we understand the different ways in which the
United States enters international commitments? This question
is usually approached from the perspective of constitutional law,
which requires reconciling today’s multifaceted practice with the
much more unitary approach set out in the Constitution. But as
interesting as the constitutional perspective is, it explains only a
fraction of what is actually going on. A far more complete picture
emerges when we look not just to constitutional law but also to
international law and administrative law. This Part describes
how each of these three strands of law shapes the processes by
which the United States joins international commitments.
A.

Constitutional Law

The Treaty Clause sets a high bar for treaty approval. Even
in the nineteenth century, proponents of international cooperation viewed the veto it gave to “a malcontent third” of the Senate
as “the original mistake in the Constitution.”23 Especially with the
development of the party system, the challenges of getting even
slightly controversial treaties through the Senate have been and
remain formidable. This in turn has led to deep interest in developing and justifying alternative paths to making international
commitments.

23 Letter from John Hay to Henry Adams (Aug 5, 1899), quoted in W. Stull Holt,
Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle between the President and the
Senate over the Conduct of Foreign Relations 177 (Johns Hopkins 1933).
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By the early twentieth century, scholars and practitioners
were beginning to categorize these paths and assess their constitutional reach.24 In 1922, not long after the Treaty of Versailles
failed in the Senate, the solicitor for the State Department prepared a memorandum for a leading member of Congress that
identified two alternative paths to international agreements.25
One path consisted of “agreements made pursuant to authority
contained in acts of Congress” and the other of “agreements entered into purely as executive acts without legislative authorization.”26 As examples of the former, the memorandum named
“postal arrangements made with foreign postal authorities; reciprocal tariff arrangements; arrangements respecting discriminatory duties, copyrights and trademarks; and agreements made
with Indians.”27 As examples of the latter, the memorandum emphasized “agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary
claims of American citizens against foreign countries,” but also
mentioned several examples pertaining to different issues.28
The constitutional scope of these alternatives became an important issue during World War II. Could the United States join
the future UN Charter through a process other than the Treaty
Clause, thus preventing a minority of the Senate from dealing it
the same fate as the Treaty of Versailles? In a 250-page article
published in two parts in the Yale Law Journal, Professor Myres
McDougal and Asher Lans argued in the affirmative.29 Their

24 For early articles analyzing historical practice, see generally John Bassett Moore,
Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 Polit Sci Q 385 (1905); James F. Barnett, International Agreements without the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 15 Yale L J 63 (1905).
25 See generally Memorandum from the Solicitor for the Department of State to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on International Executive Agreements Not Submitted to the
Senate (Aug 23, 1922) (on file with author). Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was the chair of
the Foreign Relations Committee and bore significant responsibility for the failure of the
Treaty of Versailles in the Senate.
26 Id at 1.
27 Id.
28 Id. The first thirty-one pages of the memorandum give examples of sole executive
agreements in the claims-settlement context. See id at 2–31. Only the last two pages mention other examples, some of them modi vivendi, related to military affairs, peace, fisheries, and boundaries. Id at 32–33.
29 See generally Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, Treaties and CongressionalExecutive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I,
54 Yale L J 181 (1945); Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, Treaties and CongressionalExecutive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: II,
54 Yale L J 534 (1945). Other important contemporary scholars engaged with these constitutional questions as well, reaching a range of conclusions. See Ackerman and Golove,
108 Harv L Rev at 853–56, 866–73 (cited in note 16) (summarizing the debates). The UN
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analysis used categories similar to those set out in the 1922
State Department memorandum: they focused on (1) treaties,
(2) congressional-executive agreements, and (3) presidential
agreements.30
Unlike the memorandum, McDougal and Lans staked out
bold constitutional claims. Drawing on historical practice, they
argued that congressional-executive agreements were constitutionally permissible substitutes for treaties in all contexts.31 In
making this argument, they equated congressional-executive
agreements that Congress authorized before their negotiation
and ones that Congress approved after their negotiation. (Today,
we refer to these as ex ante congressional-executive agreements
and ex post congressional-executive agreements, respectively.)
Aggregating these types of agreements strengthened McDougal
and Lans’s constitutional argument, as it enabled them to cite to
more cumulative historical practice.32 McDougal and Lans also
defended expansive presidential authority to make presidential
agreements, although they did not claim that this authority
reached as far as the other two categories.33 Throughout, they considered only the constitutionality of these various pathways and
indeed firmly disclaimed any connection between these alternatives and international law.34
Reading McDougal and Lans in some ways shows just how
little foreign relations law scholarship has changed over the
years. The three categories used by McDougal and Lans have become “Lesson I of Foreign Relations Law 101,” with the slight update that presidential agreements are now more commonly called
“sole executive agreements.”35 Scholarship considering these
pathways continues to focus on their constitutional dimensions.

Charter was ultimately approved as a treaty, but some other major agreements in the
years after World War II were done as congressional-executive agreements. Id at 889–96.
30 McDougal and Lans, 54 Yale L J at 187, 203–06 (cited in note 29) (also briefly
noting the additional category of agreements based on authorizations in existing treaties).
31 Id at 187.
32 See Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev at 868–69 (cited in note 16) (noting the
use of this technique by defenders of interchangeability).
33 McDougal and Lans, 54 Yale L J at 187 (cited in note 29) (arguing that the president has authority to make international agreements that are “within the scope of his own
constitutional powers”).
34 Id at 197 (“Whatever distinction there is between treaties and executive agreements must be found, not in the practices and doctrines of international law, but in our
own unique constitutional law.”).
35 Koh, 101 Georgetown L J at 726 (cited in note 14).
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As to congressional-executive agreements, scholars are still debating the extent to which they are constitutionally interchangeable with treaties. Professors Bruce Ackerman, David Golove,
Oona Hathaway, Peter Spiro, Laurence Tribe, and others have
all written on this topic, reaching a range of conclusions about
interchangeability.36
As to sole executive agreements, their meaning and their
reach has assumed increased importance in this era of high congressional gridlock and presidential unilateralism. Should we
classify international agreements for which there are some signals of congressional support for the aims of these agreements as
sole executive agreements or instead as something more nuanced? Can the executive branch commit the United States to any
kind of international agreement? Or is the reach of sole executive
agreements constitutionally limited in one or more of the magnitude, duration, or subject matter of the agreement? President
Obama’s willingness to make important international agreements without explicit authorization from the Senate or Congress
fueled an intense constitutional conversation in both Congress
and the academy.37
A particularly important issue for sole executive agreements
is their implementation. Supreme Court precedent establishes
that sole executive agreements relating to claims settlement can
be enforceable domestic law for purposes of the Supremacy
Clause.38 For the most part, however, the president needs
Congress in order to create domestic law. This constitutional limit
is important—functionally the most important domestic legal
limit on the scope of sole executive agreements. But as discussed
later in this Part, preexisting congressional delegations to the
president or to administrative agencies place considerable power
36 See generally, for example, Hathaway, 117 Yale L J 1236 (cited in note 16); Spiro,
79 Tex L Rev 961 (cited in note 16); Golove, 73 NYU L Rev 1791 (cited in note 16); Tribe,
108 Harv L Rev 1221 (cited in note 16); Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev 799 (cited
in note 16).
37 For congressional hearings addressing this question, see note 224. For recent articles, see generally, for example, Daniel Bodansky and Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 Vand J Transnatl L 885 (2016); Jack Goldsmith, The Contributions of the
Obama Administration to the Practice and Theory of International Law, 57 Harv Intl L J
455 (2016); David A. Wirth, The International and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A
Binding International Agreement without the Senate or Congress?, 39 Harv Envir L Rev
515 (2015); Oona A. Hathaway and Amy Kapczynski, Going It Alone: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement as a Sole Executive Agreement (ASIL Insights, Aug 24, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/7TWW-6X4G.
38 See United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 331 (1937).
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in the hands of the executive branch, which can be used to implement carefully crafted international agreements that lack specific
congressional authorization.
The constitutional reach of congressional-executive agreements and sole executive agreements are important issues in foreign relations law—yet these categories and the constitutional
questions they evoke only partly explain how the United States
participates in international commitments. These categories do
not, for example, encompass nonbinding commitments, which are
a major way in which the United States conducts diplomacy. Nor
do these categories explain how decision-making occurs within
the executive branch between the president, executive branch
agencies, and independent agencies with respect to international
commitments. The US government functions very differently in
2016 from how it did in 1922 or in 1945, yet foreign relations law
scholarship still tends to treat the executive branch as equivalent
to the president. As Professor Koh put it recently, “[w]e need a
better way to describe the texture of the tapestry of modern international lawmaking and related activities that stays truer to reality than this procrustean construct” of treaties, congressionalexecutive agreements, and sole executive agreements.39 Such a
description must look beyond constitutional law.
B.

International Law

“Fragmented,” “multi-hub,” “transnational,” and “pluralist”—these are words that scholars use to describe today’s international legal order.40 It has changed radically since World
War II. The UN Charter has come into being, with its focus on
peace, and it remains at the core of the international legal system.
But it is only a piece of the web of international legal regimes that
have emerged in the last sixty years and especially since the end

39 Koh, 101 Georgetown L J at 726–27 (cited in note 14). See also Harold Hongju Koh,
Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century International Lawmaking,
126 Yale L J F 338, 345–49 (2017) (proposing a three-factor test for evaluating whether
international commitments have been joined in a constitutionally appropriate manner).
40 See, for example, Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 Leiden J Intl L 553, 556 (2002) (fragmented); Paul
Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders 10–14
(Cambridge 2012) (pluralist); William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:
Structural Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 56 Harv Intl L J 1, 5 (2015) (multihub). “Transnational” has the oldest pedigree. See Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law 2
(Yale 1956).
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of the Cold War. Separate multilateral agreements and institutional structures exist with regard to trade, finance, disarmament, humanitarian law, the environment, and human-rights
law, in addition to countless regional and bilateral arrangements.
In addition to these various fora of cooperation among nations,
the international legal order increasingly encompasses participation by nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and subnational governmental entities.
Foreign relations law scholarship rarely considers the modern structure of the international legal system in thinking about
the pathways by which the United States joins international commitments. When international law comes up at all in the context
of the pathways, it is usually with regard to whether a noweroded distinction between “treaties” and “agreements” found in
the work of the eighteenth-century international legal scholar
Emmerich de Vattel sheds light on the constitutional scope of
treaties as opposed to congressional-executive agreements and
sole executive agreements.41 This minimal use of international
law is consistent with the constitutional-law perspective that
dominates the field.
The architecture of the international legal order nonetheless
plays a vital role in shaping how the United States joins international commitments. As a formal matter, international law has
little to say regarding the constitutional pathways by which the
United States enters into international agreements.42 In practice,
however, the superstructure of international law affects the form
of international commitments, the identity of governmental actors who participate in them, and the fora within which they are
made. These factors in turn influence the internal pathways that
are available to and used by the United States.
41 See, for example, Bradley, International Law at 91 (cited in note 11); Golove, 73
NYU L Rev at 1900–13 & n 36 (cited in note 16); Clark, 93 Va L Rev at 1592–93 (cited in
note 16).
42 Pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is now widely
regarded as embodying customary international law, heads of state and other properly
authorized national representatives have the capacity to represent their nations “for the
purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty.” Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties Art 7, 1155 UNTS 331, 334, TIAS No 18232 (May 23, 1969, entered
into force Jan 27, 1980) (“Vienna Convention”). Moreover, a nation “may not invoke the
fact that its consent to be bound by [an international agreement] has been expressed in
violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude [international
agreements] as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned
a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.” Vienna Convention Art 46, 1155
UNTS at 343.
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One important feature of the international legal order is the
place that it accords to soft-law commitments: formal political undertakings that are not binding under international law. These
commitments can be onetime affairs, such as the Iran nuclear
deal reached during the Obama administration. They can also be
made under the auspices of long-standing institutional structures, such as the food safety standards developed through the
Codex Alimentarius.43 Such soft-law commitments have largely
been overlooked by foreign relations law scholars, even though
they have now been around for quite some time.44 Because they
do not impose any international legal obligations on nations, they
are not treaties, congressional-executive agreements, or sole executive agreements and are thus largely invisible from a
constitutional-law perspective.45 Yet because they are a permissible way within the international legal order of doing business—
including very important business—they have become an important way in which the United States engages in international
cooperation.
The rising pluralism of the international legal system also
opens the door to participation by a variety of domestic legal actors. Although the text of the Constitution bars US states from
making binding international agreements without the consent of
Congress,46 in practice states have come to engage in considerable
cooperation with foreign nations and subnational entities.47 A recent example is California’s highly formalized arrangement with
Quebec to integrate their respective cap-and-trade programs for
greenhouse gases.48 Even looking within the US national
43

See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 769 (cited in note 7).
For exceptions, see generally Duncan B. Hollis and Joshua J. Newcomer, “Political” Commitments and the Constitution, 49 Va J Intl L 507 (2009) (considering soft-law
commitments from the perspective of constitutional law); Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell
L Rev 735 (cited in note 7) (analyzing how soft-law agreements engage with principles of
both foreign relations law and administrative law). Following the Iran deal, this is beginning to change. See generally, for example, Michael D. Ramsey, Evading the Treaty
Power?: The Constitutionality of Nonbinding Agreements, 11 FIU L Rev 371 (2016).
45 Hollis and Newcomer, 49 Va J Intl L at 512 (cited in note 44).
46 See US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation.”). See also US Const Art I, § 10, cl 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent
of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power.”).
47 See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 Tex L Rev 741, 747–59
(2010) (describing this growing phenomenon and explaining how changes in the international legal structure have facilitated it).
48 Agreement between the California Air Resources Board and the Gouvernement du
Québec concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for
44
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government, international cooperation is increasingly carried out
by actors outside the State Department and the White House, including at times by leaders of independent agencies. The structure of international institutions—especially soft-law ones—facilitates this actuality. By way of example, because the Basel
Committee is in essence a meeting of international bankers, US
participation there is led by the Federal Reserve Board, with the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and even the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York also participating.49
International institutions also shape and stabilize the international processes for making international agreements in ways
that can influence the domestic pathways for joining these agreements. Sometimes an international agreement itself spells out
the future process, like the way that the UN Charter gives the
Security Council the “primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security.”50 Other times, international
practice establishes patterns that serve as strong defaults. Major
environmental commitments tend to take the form of multilateral, internationally binding agreements tailored to specific environmental issues;51 international investment commitments rest
either in bilateral agreements or as part of regional trade pacts;52
and so on. As discussed in the next Section, the administrative
process by which the State Department determines the pathway
by which the United States will join an agreement in turn takes
account of these patterns.
C.

Administrative Law

A third strand of law that affects how the United States enters into international commitments is administrative law.53 Executive branch agencies and independent agencies play crucial
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/SJ3A
-8ZAU. The structure of this document very much resembles a classic international-law
agreement, complete with twenty articles, an entry-into-force provision, and a termination
provision.
49 See Michael S. Barr and Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View
from Basel, 17 Eur J Intl L 15, 32–33 (2006).
50 UN Charter Art 24(1).
51 See Dan Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey, International Environmental
Law: Mapping the Field, in Dan Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey, eds, The Oxford
Handbook of International Environmental Law 1, 20 (Oxford 2007).
52 Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U Pa L Rev 995, 998, 1057–68 (2012).
53 As the discussion of “administrative law” in this Section indicates, this Article uses
the term capaciously, including within its broad ambit transsubstantive statutes like the
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roles in the negotiation and implementation of international commitments, often but not solely due to congressional delegations of
authority. In the process, principles of regularity, accountability,
and transparency have come to play an increased role both in the
making of international commitments and in decisions about the
pathways by which these commitments shall be made.
The constitutional focus of foreign relations law tends to lead
to equation of the president and the executive branch.54 In her
important article on presidential power in the making of international agreements, for example, Hathaway concludes that there
were almost four thousand “international agreements entered by
the President acting alone” between 1980 and 2000.55 This description of the “President acting alone” is understandable from a
constitutional perspective. Practically speaking, however, the
president could not have personally negotiated (or likely even
known about) most of these agreements—instead, they would
have been done by agencies.56
Executive branch agencies owe strong allegiance to the president, both legally and functionally. Their leaders are appointed
by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, can
be removed by him or her, and are subject to various forms of
White House supervision, especially for important matters. Moreover, they are more likely in the foreign affairs context than in
the domestic context to be exercising delegated presidential powers, including the power to conduct international negotiations
and the commander-in-chief power. This is especially true of the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various
sections of Title 5, specific statutes applicable to agency action, and internal executive
branch processes that are designed to further regularity, accountability, and transparency—all of which have implications for institutional dynamics within the executive
branch.
54 The literature unpacking the executive branch is more robust in relation to national security. See, for example, Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L J 2314, 2319–42
(2006) (considering intra–executive branch checks with a particular focus on the post9/11 landscape).
55 Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 Yale L J 140, 152–53 (2009) (including both ex ante congressional-executive
agreements and sole executive agreements in this tally).
56 Indeed, some of the statutes that Hathaway identifies as delegating power to make
these agreements do not delegate power to the president but rather to cabinet officials or
other agency heads. See id at 159–65 (providing a list of statutes, some of which delegate
authority to the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the administrator of the US
Agency for International Development, and “[t]he Postal Service, with the consent of the
President”).
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Departments of State and Defense, but other executive branch
agencies can channel these powers, as well.
But the loyalties of executive branch agencies are nonetheless divided. They are of course answerable to Congress as well as
the president. Sometimes Congress has passed laws that
explicitly relate to how agencies will participate in international
negotiations—for example, Congress requires the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to publish an annual notice describing intended US participation in standard setting done by the
Codex Alimentarius and to provide an opportunity for public comment on this issue.57 In addition, the implementation of many international commitments—especially ones with a regulatory component—depends on the domestic legal powers that Congress has
delegated to these agencies. To continue with this example, the
FDA implements decisions of the Codex Alimentarius through its
preexisting powers under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.58 Finally, at a general level, the agencies are answerable to Congress
because their budgets come from Congress. To the extent that
they focus on presidential interests at the expense of congressional ones, they may face not only congressional complaints, inquiries, and hearings, but also threats to their bottom line. In
a 2016 hearing on the Paris Agreement, for example, one witness encouraged Congress to use its appropriations power to
block the EPA from expending any funds that might implement
the Agreement.59 In addition to Congress, agencies are also
strongly responsive to the interests of their own civil servants and
to various outside constituencies.60
The distinction between the president and executive
branch agencies with respect to international commitments is
demonstrated by efforts by the president to supervise agency actions in this context. For international agreements, a federal regulation provides that “[t]he Secretary of State is responsible, on
57 Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 491, Pub L No 103-465, 108 Stat 4809, 4970–
71 (1994).
58 52 Stat 1040 (1938), codified as amended at 21 USC § 301 et seq.
59 House Executive Overreach Task Force Hearing, 114th Cong, 2d Sess at 54 (cited
in note 17) (testimony of Steven Groves of The Heritage Foundation’s Freedom Project).
For an example of how Congress can use its power to influence agency participation in
ongoing negotiations within an international institution, see Kristina Daugirdas, Congress
Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107 Am J Intl L 517, 537–39 (2013) (describing how Congress used its appropriations power to pressure the Department of the
Treasury to advocate for certain policies within the World Bank).
60 See, for example, Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers,
115 Colum L Rev 515, 530–51 (2015).
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behalf of the President, for ensuring that all proposed international agreements of the United States are fully consistent with
United States foreign policy objectives.”61 Agencies must receive
the State Department’s permission to negotiate them and must
clear the final texts with the State Department prior to signature.62 There used to be no parallel for nonbinding commitments,
but in 2012 Obama issued Executive Order 13609 on Promoting
International Regulatory Cooperation, which sets up procedures
for furthering interagency cooperation with respect to “international regulatory cooperation activities that are reasonably anticipated to lead to significant regulatory actions.”63 This coordination is to run through a Regulatory Working Group chaired by
the head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
within the White House.64
As all this suggests, the making of international commitments is a ripe venue for the same kind of institutional dynamics
that play out in domestic administrative law. The president holds
the reins, and yet the agencies have considerable power to shape
their own agendas. They also have tools to resist presidential
oversight. Professor Jennifer Nou’s work describes how, in the domestic rulemaking context, agencies can deploy techniques that
“functionally serve to bypass [presidential] review, calibrate its
scrutiny, or truncate the amount of time available” for it.65 Such
ability of federal agencies to evade or resist presidential power
serves as a practical check on the reach of that power. Similar

61 22 CFR § 181.4(a). Presidential control here thus runs through the State
Department, which may use its power in ways that further a particular vision of the president’s agenda. Nonetheless, as a matter of constitutional law, the State Department is
acting here as the agent of the president. Functionally, its decisions are especially likely
to reflect presidential preferences for international agreements that are important enough
to attract the personal involvement of the president.
62 This is part of the C-175 Procedure, see notes 69–73 and accompanying text, which
goes back to the 1950s. Interestingly, it is also promoted by Congress under the CaseZablocki Act, Pub L No 92-403, 86 Stat 619 (1972), codified as amended at 1 USC § 112b
(providing that no international agreement may be signed “without prior consultation with
the Secretary of State”).
63 Executive Order 13609 § 2(a) (2013), 3 CFR 255, 255–56. Agencies must report
their intent to engage in such cooperative activities in their Regulatory Plan, which is
made public annually. Executive Order 13609 § 3(a), 3 CFR at 256 (cross-referencing Executive Order 12866). See also Executive Order 12866 § 4(c)(7) (1994), 3 CFR 638, 643
(providing that the Regulatory Plans shall be published each October).
64 Executive Order 13609 § 2, 3 CFR at 255–56.
65 Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, 126 Harv L Rev
1755, 1764 (2013).
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tools will presumably be available for international regulatory coordination, especially when it will ultimately result in domestic
rulemaking.66 Finally, also as in the domestic legal context, independent regulatory agencies have even more room to maneuver
with respect to international commitments than do executive
branch agencies67—as illustrated by the Federal Reserve’s powerful role in the negotiation and implementation of Basel III. Indeed, Professors Peter Conti-Brown and David Zaring observe
that often “the Fed sets its own foreign policy,” sometimes amidst
disagreement from executive branch agencies.68
The influence of administrative law on the making of international commitments can be found not only with respect to institutional dynamics but also with respect to underlying values of
procedural regularity and reasoned decision-making. The very
process by which the executive branch decides how to join an international commitment is designed to promote these values. To
decide whether an international agreement should be made as a
treaty, a congressional-executive agreement, or a sole executive
agreement, the State Department engages in what is known as
the “Circular 175 Procedure”—a process set out in the State
Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual69 and complemented by
provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations.70 The C-175
Procedure sets forth eight factors that State Department lawyers
should consider in determining the appropriate pathway for an
international agreement.71 These factors relate to constitutional

66 See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 769 n 168 (cited in note 7) (considering how the techniques described by Nou could play out with respect to nonbinding international commitments).
67 For example, independent regulatory agencies are simply “encouraged to comply”
with the provisions of Executive Order 13609, unlike other agencies that are required to
do so. See Executive Order 13609 §§ 4(a), 5, 3 CFR at 257.
68 Peter Conti-Brown and David Zaring, Foreign Affairs and the Federal Reserve *4,
6–7 (unpublished draft on file with author).
69 US Department of State, 11 Foreign Affairs Manual §§ 720–27, archived at http://
perma.cc/J6UY-DBPP (“11 FAM”).
70 22 CFR § 181.
71 11 FAM § 723.3 (cited in note 69). The eight factors are:

(1) [t]he extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks affecting
the nation as a whole; (2) [w]hether the agreement is intended to affect state
laws; (3) [w]hether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of
subsequent legislation by the Congress; (4) [p]ast U.S. practice as to similar
agreements; (5) [t]he preference of the Congress as to a particular type of agreement; (6) [t]he degree of formality desired for an agreement; (7) [t]he proposed
duration of the agreement, the need for prompt conclusion of an agreement, and
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concerns, to the international context in which the agreement was
reached, and to various practical considerations. For example, the
factor of “[p]ast U.S. practice as to similar agreements” is tied to
both international law and constitutional law, as the international legal context helps determine what constitutes a “similar
agreement” and past practice is relevant for assessing constitutional concerns. The C-175 Procedure also provides for consultation with congressional leaders and committees “as may be appropriate” when there is debate about whether or not an agreement
should be done as a treaty.72
Administrative-law principles also infuse other aspects of the
commitment-making process. The C-175 Procedure calls on the
negotiators of international agreements to create an opportunity
for public comment whenever, in the view of the State Department,
“circumstances permit.”73 With regard to nonbinding international commitments, Congress sometimes similarly insists that
agencies provide an opportunity in the course of negotiations for
notice and comment.74 In addition, in the Case-Zablocki Act,75
Congress required that all international agreements other than
treaties be submitted to Congress within sixty days of their entry
into force.76 Finally, when administrative agencies rely on congressionally delegated authority in implementing international
commitments into domestic law, their actions will be subject to
the Administrative Procedure Act77 (APA) and whatever administrative procedures are set forth in the legislation from which their
delegated authority stems.
Administrative-law principles thus pervade the making of international commitments. But it is important to acknowledge
that they often do so in weaker ways than in many domestic legal
contexts. For one thing, administrative agencies engaged in the
making of international commitments can invoke various limits
the desirability of concluding a routine or short-term agreement; and (8) [t]he
general international practice as to similar agreements.
72

11 FAM § 723.4 (cited in note 69).
11 FAM §§ 722(5), 725.1(6) (cited in note 69).
74 See note 57 and accompanying text.
75 Pub L No 92-403, 86 Stat 619 (1972), codified as amended at 1 USC § 112b.
76 See Case-Zablocki Act § 1, 86 Stat at 619, 1 USC § 112b(a) (further limiting the
reporting of agreements “the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion
of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States”). The C-175
Procedure also provides that “unless classified, [international agreements] generally are
published by the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs” some time following their entry into force. 11 FAM § 725.3(a) (cited in note 69).
77 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5.
73
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or exceptions that reduce transparency and public participation. The APA exempts various foreign affairs–related issues
from notice-and-comment rulemaking,78 and the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Government in the Sunshine Act79 narrowly
when it comes to the participation of US agency leaders in international negotiations.80 For another thing, the executive branch
maintains a veil over how it decides whether to push for binding
versus nonbinding commitments and over how the C-175
Procedure is applied to particular agreements. Thus, the State
Department does not typically publish or otherwise disclose its
legal reasoning with respect to the C-175 factors (and therefore
provides no opportunity for public comment on this reasoning).
Overall, while the constraints of administrative law with respect
to international commitments can be less extensive than the constraints created by administrative law in traditional domestic
contexts, they are still considerable.
II. INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The rise of multiple pathways to making international commitments has fundamentally reshaped the separation of powers
with respect to them. In the years since the Founding, the executive branch has gained a new and crucial power—the power of
choice. The executive branch selects the pathway by which the
United States will join an international commitment. In constitutional terms, this gives the president the opportunity to bypass
the Senate and often Congress, and thus to evade the traditional
constraints on presidential overreaching. Yet with this opportunity come new checks rooted in both international law and administrative law. The more the president chooses to bypass the
Senate and Congress, the stronger these checks are likely to be.
Overall, the rise of multiple pathways has led to a structural shift
away from a single, concentrated check on presidential power to
a set of checks that are individually diffuse but collectively strong.

78 See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 775–77 (cited in note 7); 5 USC
§ 553(a)(1) (exempting a “military or foreign affairs function of the United States” from
notice-and-comment rulemaking).
79 Pub L No 94-409, 90 Stat 1241 (1976), codified in various sections of Title 5.
80 Federal Communications Commission v ITT World Communications, Inc, 466 US
463, 473 (1984) (holding that the international negotiation at issue was not a meeting “of
an agency” for purposes of the Government in the Sunshine Act because the FCC did not
convene this negotiation and did not have unilateral control over its procedures).
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These checks are spread across all three stages of the commitment-making process: negotiation, domestic approval, and implementation. Not all the checks described here are present for every
international commitment—there is considerable variation
across particular commitments—but most commitments are subject to a robust set of checks. This Part describes this structural
shift and connects it to broader trends with respect to the separation of powers.
A.

The President’s Power to Choose

From a constitutional perspective, the rise of alternatives to
the Treaty Clause has greatly enhanced the president’s powers.
With these alternatives, the president has gained not only the
substantive power to make at least certain types of agreements
under his or her own authority, but also the procedural power to
choose the pathway by which an international commitment will
be approved. This power to choose is immensely important. Given
all the constitutionally defensible alternative pathways available
today, the president can almost always pursue an approach that
bypasses the subsequent approval of the Senate and Congress.
Historical practice firmly establishes the president’s authority to choose the pathway by which an international commitment
will be approved.81 Of course, the president may pick only a pathway that is constitutionally justifiable. But in choosing a pathway, the president can simultaneously widen it. As such choices
have accumulated through historical practice over time, they
have made these alternative pathways increasingly defensible as
a matter of constitutional law.82 Today, the president always has
the following three options: (1) for agreements that are binding as
a matter of international law, to go to the Senate for approval
pursuant to the Treaty Clause; (2) for any commitments dealing
81 This approach is currently embodied in the C-175 Procedure, discussed in notes
69–73 and accompanying text, in which, as a constitutional matter, the State Department
acts as the agent of the president. Congress has not to date sought to dictate the choice of
pathway (although the Case-Zablocki Act sets out procedural requirements related to this
choice), and the extent to which it could do so is an interesting constitutional question. See
note 236 (discussing a “sense of the Senate” resolution in 1969 on this issue). Sometimes
in the course of obtaining advice and consent for treaties, the executive branch makes
explicit commitments with regard to the path that will be pursued with respect to future,
related agreements.
82 See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99
Va L Rev 987, 1027–33 (2013) (discussing sole executive agreements); Curtis A. Bradley
and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv L Rev
411, 468–76 (2012) (discussing congressional-executive agreements).
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with issues within the scope of Congress’s Article I powers, to go
to Congress for its approval following their negotiation; or (3) for
commitments that are nonbinding as a matter of international
law, to approve them under his or her own authority.83 In addition, the president has a fourth option for at least many international agreements, which is to approve them without any postnegotiation action by the Senate or Congress. The constitutional
basis for this last option is one or more of a prior congressional
authorization, a prior authorization set out in a treaty, prior legislation that implicitly supports the president’s action, or the
president’s independent constitutional powers.84
This power to choose gives the president the ability to sidestep the check of legislative approval. Especially for important
agreements, this raises structural constitutional concerns. As
Professor Louis Henkin put it, the “highly uncertain” “reaches of
the President’s power to make executive agreements . . . might
tempt activist Presidents into far-reaching undertakings.”85 If going to the Senate or to Congress for specific approval is only optional for the president, then there are few if any meaningful constitutional checks on the process of approving domestic
commitments.
Following the Obama administration’s strategic use of the
president’s power to choose, this concern has received significant
attention. “Expanded use of sole executive agreements . . . reduces democratic control over international lawmaking . . . [and]
raises serious questions about the potential of these agreements
to undermine democratic lawmaking writ large,” write Professors Hathaway and Amy Kapcyzynski with regard to the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement86 (ACTA).87 In a similar vein,
Professor Michael Ramsey considers that the “aggressive approach” taken by the Obama administration with regard to the
83 See Part I.A. Constitutional law provides enough support for these options for the
president to proceed with them in the first instance. It is theoretically possible but, in my
view, highly unlikely that a court might one day find an exercise of one of these options
unconstitutional. See, for example, Made in the USA Foundation v United States, 242 F3d
1300, 1319–20 (11th Cir 2001) (finding the question whether NAFTA was appropriately
done as a congressional-executive agreement to be a “nonjusticiable political question”).
84 See Part I.A.
85 Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 224 (cited in note 11).
86 50 ILM 239 (2011).
87 Hathaway and Kapczynski, Going It Alone (cited in note 37). ACTA “establishes
new norms across a range of intellectual property rights, with an emphasis on heightened
penalties, more summary proceedings, more extensive border enforcement, and the introduction of obligations for third parties.” Id.
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Iran deal and the Paris Agreement “threatens to evade the limitations on the President imposed by the treaty making
power.”88 In Congress, the Committee on the Judiciary Task
Force on Executive Overreach held a hearing on this very issue.89
The president’s power to choose does indeed weaken the core
constitutional constraint on international commitments. Yet this
does not translate into a straightforward increase in presidential
power. When we take into account other bodies of law, other institutional actors, and other stages of the commitment-making
process, the picture is far more complex and constrained. As the
analysis below shows, the president’s power of choice is not the
power to avoid constraints entirely. Rather, it is the power to
choose between different types of constraints.
B.

Diffuse Checks, Collective Balance

Checks on presidential power do exist under the myriad pathways for making international commitments, but they look very
little like the check built into the original constitutional design.
The Treaty Clause provides a single, concentrated constitutional
check on presidential overreach. At its core, this check is
grounded in one institution (the Senate), tied to one stage of the
commitment-making process (domestic approval), and manifested in one type of activity (a supermajority vote).90 By contrast,
the various pathways for making international commitments
have given rise to a set of checks which are spread out across institutions, across phases of the commitment-making process, and
across types of activities. These checks stem from international
law and administrative law as well as from constitutional law.
Collectively they serve as robust structural safeguards on presidential power.
While some of these checks are independent, others are
closely interconnected. These relationships can be seen by looking
88

Ramsey, 11 FIU L Rev at 387 (cited in note 44).
See generally House Executive Overreach Task Force Hearing, 114th Cong, 2d Sess
(cited in note 17).
90 It isn’t quite this simple; hence the qualifier “at its core.” See Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev 59, 83–93
(2014) (discussing how the implementation of some treaties has come through practice to
depend on the passage of further legislation by Congress); Jean Galbraith, Prospective
Advice and Consent, 37 Yale J Intl L 247, 251–74, 285 (2012) (discussing how the Senate
has on rare occasions used its advice-and-consent power at the negotiating stage and also
noting how the Senate’s internal procedures enhance the already-high bar of the supermajority voting requirement).
89
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separately at the three phases of the commitment-making process: negotiation, domestic approval, and implementation. As a
general rule of thumb, the more the president wishes to duck the
need for approval from the Senate or Congress, the more limits
he or she must accept with respect to the negotiation and implementation of the commitments.
1. Negotiation.
International negotiations have always come with the practical limit that it takes at least two to tango. In today’s world, these
negotiations also take place against the backdrop of a welldeveloped international legal order. The president and his or her
agents are bound structurally and substantively in negotiations
by this international legal order, even as they also face domestic
legal constraints imposed by the future need for domestic approval and implementation of any negotiated agreement.
International law is no longer in an era of creation like that
following the end of World War II or, later, the end of the Cold
War. Substantively, major multilateral agreements already address most areas of international concern, and their foundational
legal principles cannot realistically be revisited. Structurally,
these agreements also have created institutions through which
future negotiations are channeled—for example, worldwide trade
negotiations are held under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization, and worldwide security or human-rights negotiations go through the United Nations. This thick existing framework limits what the president and his or her agents can pursue
in worldwide negotiations. It does not make new worldwide agreements impossible, but it does notably “condition[ ] the traditional
use of state power,” including by bringing formalized procedures and
often some level of transparency of process into the negotiations.91
The existing international legal structure also limits what
can be done through nonbinding commitments and through bilateral or regional agreements. In negotiating these commitments,
executive branch officials likely confront fewer procedural limits
on the negotiating process but more substantive limits set by
preexisting international law. Even modest commitments that
the president probably knows little or nothing about need to be

91 Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 213, 227 (2002)
(describing how existing treaty regimes limit the traditional diplomatic powers of powerful
states).
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negotiated with an eye to the broader international superstructure. Bilateral fisheries agreements, for example, are structured
to ensure “consisten[cy] with international law.”92 For major commitments, this need is even more acute. The terms of the Iran
deal, for example, had to be carefully negotiated in light of the
existing international legal backdrop. Among other things, because these terms dealt with sanctions previously imposed by the
UN Security Council, the negotiators had to make sure that the
deal would be one that the Security Council would accept and embrace through the passage of a subsequent resolution.93
Turning to the domestic legal backdrop, the president’s power
to negotiate seems all-encompassing at first. As a matter of constitutional law, the classic statement is that “the President alone
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.
. . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”94 But even accepting
these lines as formally correct—and the Supreme Court has recently sent mixed signals on that front95—they do not reflect the
practical realities that stem from institutional design and from
shadow-of-the-law effects related to approval and implementation. In practice, these leave the president limited in terms of both
his or her control over the negotiations and the substance of negotiating terms.
If the president will need the Senate to approve a treaty or
Congress to approve an ex post congressional-executive agreement, then as a practical matter the president needs to solicit congressional input during the negotiating process. This happens informally and also in certain formal ways. In relation to treaties,
the Senate sometimes passes resolutions requesting that the
president undertake certain negotiations or seek certain terms.96
92 See, for example, Agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Canada on Fisheries Enforcement, TIAS No 11753 (Sept
26, 1990, entered into force Dec 16, 1991) (further referencing various aspects of the law
of the sea).
93 See Jean Galbraith, Comment, Ending Security Council Resolutions, 109 Am J
Intl L 806, 807–10 (2015) (describing the interconnections between the Iran deal and a
subsequent Security Council resolution approving it).
94 United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304, 319 (1936).
95 See Zivotofsky v Kerry, 135 S Ct 2076, 2086, 2089–90 (2015) (signaling some disapproval of this language yet simultaneously affirming that the president “has the sole
power to negotiate treaties”).
96 See Galbraith, 37 Yale J Intl L at 251–52, 303–04 (cited in note 90) (describing the
Senate’s resolution during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations that the United States should
not sign any treaties that committed itself to limiting greenhouse gas emissions unless
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In relation to trade agreements, Congress has over the years
passed “fast-track” statutes that give the president an expedited
route to an ex post floor vote if the president pursues certain negotiating objectives and involves members of Congress in the negotiations in certain formalized ways.97 And even when they are
not asked for their views, members of Congress can find ways to
weigh in—as with the letter sent by Senator Tom Cotton and numerous other senators to Iranian leaders during the negotiations
of the Iran deal.98
A more overlooked but comparably important way in which
the president must share negotiating power stems from the role
of administrative agencies. The president depends on agencies to
carry out most international negotiations. The routine small-scale
negotiations that make up the vast majority of international commitments are less exercises of presidential power than of bureaucratic power over which the president keeps a supervisory eye
through his or her agents in the State Department and the White
House. And even major negotiations can occur with relatively little oversight from the president. The increased use of nonbinding
political commitments has increased the president’s power to bypass the Senate and Congress, but it has also increased the power
of agencies and US states to negotiate in the foreign affairs space
with relatively little presidential oversight.99 In addition to the
example of Basel III, international regulatory coordination with
respect to insurance policy is currently carried out through cooperative efforts between US states and various federal agencies,
including the Federal Insurance Office, an office within the
Treasury Department created by Congress for this purpose in the
Dodd-Frank Act.100
developing counties similarly bound themselves and the treaty would not seriously harm
the US economy).
97 For an overview, see generally Ian F. Fergusson, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy (Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/PQH4-9CW3.
98
Tom Cotton, et al, Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar
9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/KZ73-5UX7. For a detailed picture drawn from
Wikileaks data of the direct diplomatic activities of members of Congress, see Ryan M.
Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 Mich L Rev 331, 336–56 (2013).
99 For elaboration of this point with respect to the Federal Reserve, see generally
Conti-Brown and Zaring, Foreign Affairs and the Federal Reserve (cited in note 68). For
discussion of how states make nonbinding commitments with foreign states, see Hollis, 88
Tex L Rev at 743–44 (cited in note 47) (concluding that such commitments have become
“remarkably common”).
100 See The Impact of International Regulatory Standards on the Competitiveness of
U.S. Insurers, Part II, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance of the
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Even when the negotiation of international commitments lies
with the president’s traditional diplomatic agents in the State
Department, these diplomats can have strong incentives to listen
to agencies. Agencies can bring valuable contributions to the table
on commitments that relate to their expertise. Even more importantly, an agency will be essential to implementation as an institutional matter if the president intends to bypass subsequent
approval by the Senate or Congress and instead implement the
commitment by drawing on an agency’s preexisting domestic authority. The negotiation of the Minamata Convention on Mercury
is a good example. This multilateral international agreement requires state parties to take specific steps to reduce the amount of
mercury in the environment.101 The United States joined this
agreement in 2013—the same year that its negotiation was finalized—without receiving the advice and consent of the Senate or
the ex post approval of Congress.102 The State Department explained that “[t]he United States has already taken significant
steps to reduce the amount of mercury we generate and release to
the environment, and can implement Convention obligations under existing legislative and regulatory authority.”103 To ensure
that the United States could in fact implement the Convention in
light of preexisting regulatory power, however, US diplomats had
to make sure during the Convention’s negotiations that its obligations would not go beyond what the United States already had
the power to implement. These diplomats thus had to engage the
EPA in these negotiations and rely on its understanding of its
regulatory power under congressional statutes.104 In turn, US negotiators could credibly signal that they were constrained
negotiators to foreign counterparts.105
House Committee on Financial Services, 114th Cong, 2d Sess 6–8 (2016) (testimony of Professor David Zaring) (describing ways in which a proposed bill in Congress would incorporate more administrative-law principles into this negotiating process).
101 Minamata Convention on Mercury, 55 ILM 586 (2016) (not in force).
102 See Duncan Hollis, Doesn’t the U.S. Senate Care about Mercury? (Opinio Juris,
Nov 12, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/5GHZ-3XMC.
103 US Department of State, United States Joins Minamata Convention on Mercury
(Nov 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/66VU-SNSJ.
104 See Minamata Convention on Mercury (EPA), archived at http://perma.cc/U5LC
-HVSY (noting that “EPA worked closely with the State Department and other federal
agencies in the negotiation of this agreement”).
105 The fact that US negotiators can be domestically constrained even without the
subsequent need for legislative approval is recognized, if less discussed, in classic work on
international bargaining. See, for example, Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Intl Org 427, 429, 448 (1988) (giving an example
of how the president was a constrained negotiator even though approval from the Senate
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2. Approval.
The choices available to the president for approval depend on
the form and content of the negotiated agreement and on whether
the executive branch has the preexisting power to implement it.
This choice thus implicates issues of international law, constitutional law, and administrative law.
For commitments that are nonbinding as a matter of international law, the president can approve them without further action
by the Senate or Congress. In theory, this gives the president
enormous power—so much so that scholars are beginning to urge
that constitutional limits be read into the president’s power to approve nonbinding commitments.106 In practice, the power looks
less overwhelming. Internationally, the use of a nonbinding commitment must not only be consented to by negotiating partners
(as with all international commitments), but will also need to be
structured in a way that is consistent with existing international
law because a nonbinding agreement cannot change international
law.107 Domestically, the president may face political pressure to
pursue a binding rather than a nonbinding agreement. Moreover,
as discussed shortly, if the executive branch does not have the
preexisting power to implement the commitment, it will need to
obtain either implementing legislation from Congress or the support of US states.
For international agreements, the president faces legal as
well as political constraints on the power to choose. Internationally, there may be political constraints imposed by negotiating
partners, who may want the president to obtain the stronger signal of commitment embodied by a domestic pathway that includes
the explicit approval of the Senate or Congress.108 Domestically,
as a matter of process, decision-making with respect to the president’s power of choice is carried out by officials in the State
Department who are applying the C-175 Procedure. For almost
and Congress was not required, although also offering other examples when such approval
would be required).
106 See Hollis and Newcomer, 49 Va J Intl L at 538–75 (cited in note 44). See also
generally Ramsey, 11 FIU L Rev 371 (cited in note 44).
107 See, for example, notes 219–21 and accompanying text (detailing how the president’s negotiators could not achieve having the overall structure of the Paris Agreement
take a nonbinding form).
108 See generally Lisa L. Martin, The President and International Commitments:
Treaties as Signaling Devices, 35 Pres Stud Q 440 (2005) (arguing that the form of domestic ratification serves as a signal of the strength of the US intentions in ways that other
nations may view as significant).
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all agreements, their decisions will presumably track existing
practice. It is in only a few—but important—situations when
presidential strategy will presumably come into play. Indeed, the
practice of the Obama administration suggests the limited practical reach of the president’s power to choose the path of international agreements. The administration has sent treaties to the
Senate when past practice almost uniformly supports the use of
the treaty route for a particular type of major agreement, including the New START Treaty (which received advice and consent
by a 71–26 vote)109 and the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (which failed by a 61–38 vote).110 Consistent with both past practice and the practical need for implementing legislation, the Obama administration could not join the
TPP without congressional approval, and this agreement has
since been abandoned by the Trump administration.111 By contrast, when the Obama administration signaled its intent to bypass the subsequent approval of the Senate or Congress despite
substantial practice in favor of pursuing such approval, it did so
only when (1) some plausible past practice supported its approach
and (2) it considered that it has the preexisting authority to implement these agreements. This was the case for ACTA, the
Minamata Convention, and the Paris Agreement.112 Notably, the
Obama administration faced considerable pushback with regard
to the legality of its decision to bypass the Senate and Congress
for both ACTA and the Paris Agreement.113 (The less prominent
Minamata Convention flew mostly under the radar.) Perhaps in
part because of this pushback, the Obama administration never
acted on its asserted power to join the United States to ACTA,
109 Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to the New START Treaty at 23472 (cited
in note 5).
110 Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, 112th Cong, 2d Sess, in 158 Cong Rec 16184–85 (Dec 4, 2012).
111 See Statement by the President on the Signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(cited in note 10); Presidential Memorandum regarding Withdrawal of the United States
(cited in note 10).
112 For past practice relevant to ACTA, see Galbraith, 99 Va L Rev at 1040–41 (cited
in note 82). For past practice relevant to the Minamata Convention and the Paris
Agreement, see Wirth, 39 Harv Envir L Rev at 552–61 (cited in note 37). This Article takes
no position on whether the administration’s decision to bypass the Senate and Congress
for the Minamata Convention stemmed from concerns about resistance to the Convention
or instead from an interest in establishing a precedent that in turn would be useful for the
Paris Agreement.
113 See Part IV (describing resistance to the administration’s choice with respect to
the Paris Agreement). See also Galbraith, 99 Va L Rev at 1040–41 (cited in note 82) (describing resistance to the administration’s choice with respect to the ACTA).
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although it did indeed join the Paris Agreement and the
Minamata Convention.
3. Implementation.
As with the negotiation and approval of international commitments, there is no one-size-fits-all account of implementation.
Instead, how a commitment is implemented depends on what the
commitment is, how it has been approved, and what existing law
relates to its implementation. These factors determine the scope
of what the president can do.
At the international level, major multilateral commitments
often require transparency with respect to implementation. The
Minamata Convention, for example, requires each state party to
file reports on how it is implementing the Convention and provides certain soft oversight tools to the Conference of the Parties
and an Implementation and Compliance Committee.114 These requirements are designed to enable countries to keep an eye on
each other, but they also provide sunshine for domestic actors
who wish to scrutinize executive branch action with respect to the
implementation of commitments.
Turning to domestic law, to ensure that the United States can
implement an international commitment, the executive branch
will generally need one or more of the following: (1) an independent power of the president that provides for implementation,
(2) the international commitment to receive advice and consent
from the Senate as a treaty and/or congressional legislation implementing it, or (3) the terms of the commitment to be ones that
can be or already are implemented pursuant to preexisting
statutes.115 Each of these categories comes with its own set of
constraints.
The main constraint on the president’s independent powers
is their limited scope. The president can fulfill commitments to
communicate with other nations, to recognize foreign nations, to
take steps pursuant to the commander-in-chief power, and to settle certain claims between US citizens and foreign states and
114

Minamata Convention on Mercury Arts 15, 21–23, 55 ILM at 599–600, 602–04.
A fourth, rarer category is a commitment whose terms will be implemented by US
states. In a very early example of a significant nonbinding commitment, for example, President Theodore Roosevelt reached an arrangement with Japan whose terms tacitly depended on Roosevelt’s ability to persuade California to improve its treatment of Japanese
schoolchildren. See Devon W. Carbado, Yellow by Law, 97 Cal L Rev 633, 641–43 (2009)
(describing the “Gentlemen’s Agreement”).
115
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other foreign entities.116 Most of these powers relate to outwardfacing actions by the United States rather than to the regulation
of the conduct of private citizens. The Supreme Court has indicated that, outside the context of claims settlement, the president
has starkly limited independent power to implement an international commitment in a way that affects the domestic legal rights
of US states or private parties.117
When the president seeks the advice and consent of the Senate and/or specific legislation from Congress, the check is the legislative process, with all the democratic principles that it embodies. For international agreements, the president will typically get
any needed legislative authorization to implement the agreement
simultaneously with the process of domestic approval.118 For nonbinding commitments, implementing legislation is more likely to
postdate the approval process. For example, President George W.
Bush made a soft-law commitment on behalf of the United States
to stem the import of conflict diamonds and then sought and obtained a specific statute to implement it.119 If there is divergence
between the implementing legislation and the international commitment, then it is the terms of the implementing legislation that
will control within the United States.120
As to the third category, the constraints that exist when a
preexisting statute authorizes implementation will vary with the
content of the statute. The broader the statute’s scope, the more
the executive branch can use it as implementing authority. The
more discretion the statute gives to executive branch actors, the
more these actors can use this discretion in the service of implementing an international commitment. And the fewer procedural

116 This list is exemplary rather than exclusive. For a longer discussion of the president’s powers, see Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 31–62 (cited in note 11).
117 Medellin v Texas, 552 US 491, 527–32 (2008) (emphasizing that the president
lacks the power to make domestic law and describing the claims-settlement context as
“involv[ing] a narrow set of circumstances”).
118 The authority to implement treaties sometimes flows from their status as the law
of the land (which in turn requires that they have received the Senate’s advice and consent
and been ratified) and sometimes from implementing legislation passed by Congress,
which in practice will typically be passed before the president ratifies the treaty. See Galbraith, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev at 76 & n 62 (cited in note 90). For ex post congressionalexecutive agreements, in essence Congress votes simultaneously on the approval and implementation of the agreement. See Fergusson, Trade Promotion Authority at *1, 10 (cited
in note 97).
119 See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 778–81 (cited in note 7).
120 See id at 786–87 (giving an example of the controlling effect of the terms of the
implementing legislation with respect to Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act).
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constraints the statute (and other relevant statutes) has, the easier it will be to use this statute to implement the international
commitment.
In practice, however, Congress does not typically pass statutes with sweeping substantive reach, enormous executive
branch discretion, and minimal procedural safeguards. Congress
comes closest when enacting traditional foreign policy statutes,
such as those relating to sanctions, and even these will come with
nontrivial limits. For example, in the years prior to the Iran deal,
Congress passed numerous statutes imposing sanctions on
Iran.121 For the most part—but not entirely—these statutes explicitly gave the president the authority to waive these sanctions
under certain conditions.122 Because President Obama planned to
rely on his discretion to waive these sanctions in order to implement the core US commitments under the Iran deal, his negotiators had to ensure that the deal stayed within the limits of his
discretionary authority. To give only one example, one of the congressional statutes at issue expressly authorized state and local
governments to divest from actors owning a certain stake in Iran’s
energy sector.123 Obama thus had to make sure that the Iran deal
did not commit the United States to ending these divestment
measures, as he could not have implemented such a provision.124
Here, as in other ways with respect to the Iran deal, the limits
attached to implementation shaped the content of the negotiations. In addition, the very fact that the Iran deal relied so heavily
on Obama’s discretionary authority in implementation leaves it
deeply vulnerable to abandonment by his successor.125
When the president seeks to use domestic policy statutes for
the implementation of international commitments, he or she will

121 For a fuller and more complex picture, see Dianne E. Rennack, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions *5–32 (Congressional Research Service, Jan 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/XLP4-2ZE6.
122 See id (listing the various statutes and noting the availability of waivers).
123 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 § 202,
Pub L No 111-195, 124 Stat 1312, 1342–43, codified at 22 USC § 8532.
124 See Jack Goldsmith and Amira Mikhail, Does the Iran Deal Require the USG to
Seek Preemption of (Some) State Sanctions? (Lawfare, Apr 27, 2016), archived at http://
perma.cc/4SK7-ARL2. For a list of many other sanctions that the Iran deal left in place,
see Rennack, Iran at *33–36 (cited in note 121).
125 See David E. Sanger, Trump Seeks Way to Declare Iran in Violation of Nuclear
Deal (NY Times, July 27, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/world/
middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-agreement.html (visited Aug 19, 2017) (Perma archive
unavailable) (describing how President Trump is interested in abandoning the Iran deal
despite having continued to abide by it so far).
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likely face even more notable constraints. These statutes may
have broad substantive scope, but the discretion they provide is
likely to be bestowed on an agency rather than on the president
and to include procedural safeguards like judicial review. Consider, for example, a statute that gives broad discretion to an administrative agency to regulate on health, food safety, or the environment. As a practical matter, if the president wishes to
implement an international commitment by using the discretion
accorded to the agency, then he or she must negotiate it within
these limits, must obtain buy-in from the agency, and must also
run the risk that this buy-in will be withdrawn—and the commitment’s implementation put at risk—during a future administration.126 In addition, the agency’s actions in implementing the statute will almost certainly be subject to judicial review (under the
APA or the statute’s own terms) with respect to whether these
actions are consistent with the statute and neither arbitrary nor
capricious. As Professor Jack Goldsmith put it, in considering
Obama’s energetic use of these kinds of international commitments, their underlying “domestic authority . . . , unlike many assertions of presidential foreign relations power, can be reviewed
by domestic federal courts,” making for “significantly more accountability than the vast majority of presidential actions in foreign relations.”127
C.

International Commitments in Perspective

The restructured separation of powers described above occurs
in the context of international commitments. At a higher level of
generality, however, it is consistent with a broader account of
how, across many areas of governance, the various strands of applicable law are not hermetically sealed from each other. Instead,
they interact in ongoing ways that affect not only the functional
separation of powers but also the development of legal doctrine.
Scholars of constitutional law and administrative law have
explored their relationship in domestic contexts. As one notable
example, Professor Gillian Metzger argues that “ordinary administrative law” serves as “a species of constitutional common
law,” bringing constitutional values into the practice of governance.128 Agencies are sensitive to constitutional concerns in their
126

See Part IV.B (discussing this possibility with respect to the Paris Agreement).
Goldsmith, 57 Harv Intl L J at 471 (cited in note 37).
128 Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law,
110 Colum L Rev 479, 485 (2010).
127

2017]

From Treaties to International Commitments

1711

decision-making, and courts applying administrative law in reviewing agency decisions draw on constitutional separation-ofpowers principles.129 In turn, “ordinary administrative law and
administrative practice [have shaped] the scope of constitutional
requirements [in a way that] is of a piece with the numerous
ways in which constitutional law has bent and transformed in
response to the institutional and regulatory needs of the modern
administrative state.”130 Administrative law comes to substitute
in part for constitutional law, but it does so largely because it
also provides for checks and balances.
Just as functional and institutional needs led constitutional
law to accept the administrative state, so have similar needs led
to the rise of alternatives to the Treaty Clause. These alternatives
in turn rely heavily on administrative law for implementation
and thus on all the underlying constitutional principles that this
law incorporates. This includes any use of federalism. The more
the president seeks to make international commitments whose
implementation will require the cooperation of US states, the
more influence these states will have on international negotiations despite the president’s formal constitutional control over
such negotiations.
The insights in this Article also relate to a body of scholarship
that considers the interplay between international law and constitutional law. While in theory international law and constitutional law could serve as structural substitutes,131 in practice their
relationship is more complicated. Judicial review is not always
available for foreign affairs matters,132 and, especially in the

129 See id at 486–512. For an extended historical account of how agencies can engage
in constitutional decision-making, see generally Sophia Z. Lee, The Workplace Constitution from the New Deal to the New Right (Cambridge 2014).
130 Metzger, 110 Colum L Rev at 508 (cited in note 128). See also Michaels, 115 Colum
L Rev at 520 (cited in note 60). The role played by federalism in administrative law can
similarly have structural implications for constitutional principles of the separation of powers, as the work of Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen shows. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 Colum L Rev 459, 461–63 (2012).
131 See Daniel Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 49 Stan
J Intl L 1, 36–49 (2013) (arguing that the president’s foreign affairs powers as a matter of
domestic law should vary with the level of constraint arising from the international political context).
132 By contrast, administrative law’s ability to channel constitutional values and to
substitute for other forms of constitutional checks is due in no small part to the availability
of judicial review. See Metzger, 110 Colum L Rev at 485 (cited in note 128) (noting the
significance of “judicial development of administrative law doctrines that respond to constitutional concerns associated with administrative government”).
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security context, the executive branch sometimes plays international law and constitutional law off each other in ways that erode
them both.133 This literature urges caution before assuming that
international law can serve successfully as a long-term structural
substitute for constitutional law.
Unlike in the security context, however, the president faces
important process checks with regard to international commitments at the international level that increase its reliability as a
constraint. The executive branch can undertake uses of force
based on broad interpretations of international law on selfdefense without getting other nations to agree with this position,
but it cannot negotiate a multilateral commitment without getting other nations on board.134 The agreement of these nations
would be needed not only to make a commitment, but also to make
changes in the international legal superstructure of existing major international agreements that exist in most areas of international cooperation. The constraints that apply to the making of
international agreements are thus more self-enforcing than the
constraints that tend to exist with regard to the interpretation of
substantive international law.
III. INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND THE FUTURE
Scholars and the political branches have long accepted the
practical necessity of putting the executive branch in control of
minor commitments, which are the bread and butter of US international engagement. But what about major commitments? The
Obama administration deliberately avoided seeking the explicit
approval of the Senate or Congress for some important commitments, thus extending past practices with regard to alternative
pathways and achieving core policy interests. This Part defends
these developments from a normative perspective, taking into account the importance of international cooperation, the existence
of the checks and balances described earlier in this Article that
are distinct from those embodied in congressional approval, and
133 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91
NYU L Rev 689, 708–12 (2016); Rebecca Ingber, International Law Constraints as Executive Power, 57 Harv Intl L J 49, 57–90 (2016); Galbraith, 99 Va L Rev at 1008–33 (cited in
note 82).
134 See Ashley Deeks, Checks and Balances from Abroad, 83 U Chi L Rev 65, 68 (2016)
(noting that if “one recognizes that US national security increasingly relies on relationships with foreign partners, then the idea that the executive responds to foreign critiques
and concerns to enable ongoing partnerships has bite”).
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the further check that arises from the existing uncertainties surrounding where the constitutional boundaries lie. In light of this
normative defense, this Part then intervenes in several ongoing
structural and doctrinal debates in foreign relations law.
A.

In Praise of Multiple Pathways

What are we to make of the current system and in particular
of the executive branch’s ability to make major international commitments without getting specific legislative approval? The clearest line drawn by this system with respect to the separation of
powers between the executive branch and the legislature is one
whereby the executive branch can enter into international commitments on its own but needs some kind of preexisting or subsequent action from the Senate or Congress in order for the terms
of these commitments to be implemented through domestic law.
This line may not be perfect, but it is better than one that requires
the executive branch to get specific legislative approval for all major commitments, or for the narrower subset of all major agreements, or even for the still narrower subset of all major agreements whose implementation requires the use of domestic law.
This line promotes international cooperation; it satisfies core
structural principles related not only to checks and balances but
also more specifically to democratic accountability; and it relies
constructively on the very uncertainty surrounding it. Together,
these virtues provide the current system with a solid normative
grounding.
1. Promoting international cooperation.
The current system favors international engagement by giving the executive branch more ways to make international commitments. Without the rise of ex post congressional-executive
agreements as an alternative to the Treaty Clause, we might not
have had the annexation of Texas, the creation of the Saint
Lawrence Seaway, or free trade agreements like NAFTA.135 If the
president could not make any major international commitments
on his own, we might not have had the Paris Peace Accords ending the Vietnam War, the Shanghai Communique leading to the
normalization of relations with mainland China, or the Helsinki
Accords bettering relations between the Soviet Union and the
135 See Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev at 802–06, 832–36, 893–95 (cited in
note 16).
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West.136 If the executive branch needed specific legislative approval in order to make international commitments whose implementation depends on US domestic law, then we might not have
the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and
its various protocols,137 Basel III,138 the Iran deal, or the Paris
Agreement.
One may disagree with the merits of one or more of these
commitments, but it is hard to argue with their collective demonstration that the Treaty Clause presents too high a bar to action
to be the only route available for major international commitments. The message of the second and third sets of examples is
that sometimes specific congressional approval similarly presents
too high a bar. In the domestic context, some form of congressional
action is usually a starting point for executive branch action. This
creates enormous challenges for governance, particularly with
the rise of partisan polarization and its attendant congressional
gridlock in recent years.139 In the international context, always
requiring specific congressional action would be even less palatable. International cooperation is often highly desirable, and sometimes, especially in the context of peace and security, it is essential. Because the United States has less control over international
affairs than domestic ones, the executive branch can have an even
higher functional need to act in this context—and to do so with
flexibility and sometimes with speed. Indeed, if specific congressional approval were required for all major international commitments, then these commitments would face greater process hurdles than exist for domestic legislation, as they would require not
only the agreement of Congress and the president but also of the
international negotiating partners.
The appropriateness of allowing the executive branch to
make major international commitments without specific legislative approval is made all the more clear when considered in
tandem with the president’s war powers. The president today can

136 See Galbraith, 37 Yale J Intl L at 287–88 (cited in note 90); Hollis and Newcomer,
49 Va J Intl L at 510–11 (cited in note 44).
137 Wirth, 39 Harv Envir L Rev at 552 (cited in note 37).
138 See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 786 (cited in note 7).
139 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 Va L Rev
953, 959–63 (2016) (describing the general rise of partisan polarization). See also generally
Glen S. Krutz and Jeffrey S. Peake, President Obama, Congress and International Agreements: An Initial Assessment (APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, Aug 28, 2011), archived
at http://perma.cc/S45R-5523 (concluding that Senate polarization with respect to treaties
had been even higher for President Obama than for prior presidents).
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initiate the use of force with relatively few checks, either internationally or domestically.140 If specific legislative approval were required for international commitments, then this would effectively
incentivize the president toward force over diplomacy. By allowing the president to unilaterally end the Vietnam War, normalize
relationships with China, and ease relations with the Soviet
Union, the current system gives greater space for diplomacy. This
point holds as well for the Iran deal. If President Obama had
needed specific congressional approval for the deal, then he would
have had greater incentives to pursue military alternatives to
stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.141 The war–
diplomacy trade-off is less evident for climate-change agreements—though still present in the long run142—and absent from
some other forms of international commitments, but when it exists it is an important factor to consider.
In defending the use of multiple pathways as a means to promoting international cooperation, this discussion assumes neither that multiple pathways are always necessary to such cooperation nor that such cooperation is always good. The arguments
are instead qualified ones. The lower the barriers to international
commitments that there are as a matter of legislative process, the
less functional need there is for alternative pathways. If our system of governance were parliamentary or were structured in ways
that made it much less prone to polarization, then the functional
need for alternative pathways would be lessened. Without such
changes (and at present they seem highly unlikely), the existence of multiple pathways serves as a workable and valuable
substitute. Similarly, the claim that international cooperation is
desirable should not be mistaken for the claim that it is always
desirable (let alone that it will please everyone). International cooperation is itself only a means to the ends of peace, prosperity,
140 See generally Bradley and Galbraith, 91 NYU L Rev 689 (cited in note 133) (describing the growth of the president’s unilateral war powers over time, including the power
to act without congressional authorization).
141 Even with diplomatic options, forcible intervention remains a possibility, as
demonstrated by the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program, which
was carried out in part by the United States. See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up
Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran (NY Times, June 1, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/
2F2T-LPYS.
142 See US Department of Defense, National Security Implications of Climate-Related
Risks and a Changing Climate *3 (July 23, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/C6BG-Y7SQ
(noting that “climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security,
contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources such as food and water”).
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the promotion of human rights, and the protection of shared commons; it can also be used in ways that undermine these values.
We should hope and expect that the executive branch will ordinarily seek to use international cooperation in favor of good ends
rather than bad ones. The structural checks and balances that
come with the alternative pathways increase the likelihood that
this will prove true.
2. Satisfying core structural principles.
Turning to structure, the current system builds in important
checks on presidential overreaching, including checks that are
tied to legislative involvement. Part II showed how this system
constrains presidential power through multiple strands of law. To
borrow from a broader conversation on presidential power, the final result is one of “power and constraint” rather than the “executive unbound.”143 Importantly, some of these constraints reflect
forms of democratic accountability. These forms of oversight are
less obvious, less demanding, and less supermajoritarian than the
need to get the affirmative approval of either the Senate or
Congress. They nonetheless are meaningful and make it highly
likely that international commitments that bypass specific legislative approval will do more than simply reflect presidential
preferences.
This issue of democratic accountability is particularly salient
for important international commitments that will be implemented through US domestic law. The Iran deal and the Paris
Agreement are examples of such commitments made by Obama.
US commitments under the Iran deal are being implemented by
the president using authority delegated to him by preexisting congressional laws that allow him to waive sanctions against Iran if
he deems it in the national interest.144 At the Paris negotiations,
US negotiators anticipated that US commitments under the Paris
Agreement would be implemented through the EPA’s preexisting
authority under the Clean Air Act.145 These commitments thus
deal with matters that fall under the purview of Congress, as
opposed to matters of recognition, security, and diplomacy with
143 Compare generally Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency after 9/11 (Norton 2012), with Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive
Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford 2010).
144 See Rennack, Iran at *5–31 (cited in note 121) (outlining the fuller and more complex picture).
145 See Part IV.B.
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regard to which the president is understood to have considerable
independent constitutional powers. Yet the Congresses that
passed these preexisting laws did not expressly authorize them to
be used as implementing authority for international commitments. Given the absence of express authorization, should the executive branch be able to infer that it can harness these laws to
its own international objectives?
Two reasons suggest that the answer should generally be yes.
First, in relying on these laws to implement international commitments, the Obama administration was furthering the congressional purposes underlying these laws. In the case of the Iran
sanctions, Congress deliberately entrusted the president with
broad discretion to lift them in order to advance US national interests. Allowing the president to use his delegated powers as negotiating leverage with Iran seems like a patently obvious way to
use this discretion.146 In the case of the Clean Air Act, the purposive link is at a higher level of generality. The Congress that
passed the Clean Air Act in the 1970s did not have climate change
clearly in mind, let alone international coordination in relation to
it. But its broader purpose of protecting public health and welfare
through the regulation of air pollution is advanced if the United
States can persuade other countries to reduce their own air pollution, because air pollution is a transborder problem (especially
for climate change).147 To the extent that the Clean Air Act also
sought to balance economic concerns, its use as negotiating leverage to get other countries to act with respect to climate change
likewise promotes this interest—the more other countries are addressing climate change, the more the playing field is leveled in
terms of effects on economic competition. There are doubtless
some issues in which international cooperation would not enhance the underlying congressional purposes,148 but in general
such cooperation seems likely to do so.

146 See Japan Whaling Association v American Cetacean Society, 478 US 221, 241
(1986) (concluding that the secretary of commerce “furthered [the] objective” of a statute
authorizing the impositions of sanctions related to whaling when he chose not to impose
sanctions but instead to “enter[ ] into [an] agreement with Japan, calling for that nation’s
acceptance of [a] worldwide moratorium on commercial whaling”).
147 See 42 USC § 7415 (noting the prospect of “[i]nternational air pollution”).
148 See Goldsmith, 57 Harv Intl L J at 467–68 (cited in note 37) (discussing a congressional statute that sought to limit certain forms of collaboration with China in the technology space).
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A second reason why the executive branch should be able to
harness preexisting laws to implement international commitments that it makes without specific legislative approval is that
this process naturally brings the interests of Congress into the
negotiation and implementation of an international commitment.
If it intends to rely on preexisting legislation for implementing
authority, the executive branch can agree only to terms with respect to implementation that are within the bounds of what the
Congress that passed this legislation already authorized as a matter of domestic law. Similarly, in implementing the international
commitment domestically, the executive branch must accept
whatever tools of accountability are built into the law it is using
for implementation authority, including judicial review. The executive branch also has some degree of accountability to the current Congress, although far less than if it needed to get that Congress to vote affirmatively in favor of the commitment. At a
minimum, the executive branch must have enough supporters in
Congress to prevent the passage of a veto-proof law that strips it
of its ability to rely on the preexisting legislation, whether by
modifying that legislation or providing that it cannot be the basis
for implementation.149 The executive branch will also be subject to
whatever soft-law tools the current Congress deploys.150 The more
the preexisting law gives implementing authority to administrative agencies rather than to the president, the greater Congress’s
abilities will be to deploy these tools.
A distinct but related ground for concern about the democratic accountability of international commitments made without
specific legislative approval goes to whether they would unduly
thwart changes in democratic preferences over time. If the president makes an international commitment whose terms extend beyond his or her time in office, then the next president may feel
pressured to honor this commitment despite not approving of it.151
149 For a discussion of the complicated way in which these issues played out in relation
to the Iran deal, see David M. Herszenhorn, The Iran Nuclear Deal: Congress Has Its Say
(NY Times, Sept 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U7QP-VV2T.
150 See Part I.B.
151 Similarly, Congress might feel pressured to honor an international commitment
and therefore not repeal or alter preexisting legislation that is being used to implement
this commitment. Professors Hathaway and Kapczynski make this argument in relation
to ACTA, see Hathaway and Kapczynski, Going It Alone (cited in note 37), even though it
has a 180-day withdrawal provision that could be invoked. See ACTA Art 41, 50 ILM at
256. I focus here only on the future president’s incentives because any efforts by Congress
to get the United States to violate or withdraw from an international commitment would
almost certainly need his or her support.
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Professor Ramsey, for example, argues that nonbinding political
commitment cannot “constrain future Presidents (even informally)” without raising constitutional problems,152 and Professor
Goldsmith notes that “the President can effectively change reliance interests through his delegated authorities in ways that are
credible and sticky because they are hard for a future president
to unwind.”153 For international agreements that do not expressly
allow for withdrawal or that allow for withdrawal only after the
passage of multiple years, the issue is particularly significant because the future president would have to choose between abiding
by the agreement for an extended period of time or failing to comply with an international legal obligation.154
This concern is legitimate but adequately met by the current
system. To begin with, the administration that makes an international commitment should foresee the risk that a new administration will have different preferences. While it has incentives to try
to nudge this administration toward continuing its approach, it
also must recognize that the more partisan a commitment it
makes, the greater the odds are that this commitment will be repudiated. It must also recognize that failing to leave the next administration with an internationally lawful option of exit could
incentivize that administration to pursue violations of international law in ways that could damage the reputation of the United
States. This is one reason that using nonbinding international
commitments will be appealing to an administration, as it provides a lawful if diplomatically awkward justification for noncompliance and means of exit.
For international agreements, the legal availability of withdrawal is more complicated. Most international agreements contain withdrawal clauses that the future president could choose to
invoke.155 As a matter of administrative procedure, the C-175
Procedure makes the proposed duration of an agreement a factor
that is to be considered in determining whether or not to seek

152

Ramsey, 11 FIU L Rev at 375–76 (cited in note 44).
Goldsmith, 57 Harv Intl L J at 471 (cited in note 37). See also Koh, 126 Yale L J F
at 359–61 (cited in note 39) (discussing how the “default path of least resistance becomes
compliance”).
154 See Hathaway, 119 Yale L J at 258–59 (cited in note 55) (arguing that as a prudential matter, international agreements whose terms require more than a year’s notice
for withdrawal should go to the Senate or Congress for specific approval).
155 See Barbara Koremenos, The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design 143 (Cambridge 2016).
153
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specific approval from the Senate or Congress.156 The rare international agreements that lack withdrawal procedures—such as
major human-rights instruments—go to the Senate for approval
as treaties as a matter of constitutional custom and perhaps constitutional obligation, thus ensuring strong supramajoritarian review.157 While many international agreements provide for withdrawal upon a year or less of notice, some make withdrawal
permissible beginning only after several years have elapsed since
the agreement’s entry into force. The Minamata Convention, for
example, provides that a nation can give one year’s notice of withdrawal at any point after the initial three years following its entry
into force.158 The Paris Agreement has a similar provision, except
that it also provides a backdoor route for withdrawal after only a
single year.159 Such agreements thus left a lawful exit route for
the next president, but one that could not be invoked for a while.
Because the administration that makes an international commitment has reasons not to lock its successor in too thoroughly, the
future president will typically have a lawful exit option available
at some point during his or her term. In addition, regardless of
international legal considerations, the next president’s own democratically elected mandate may empower him or her to pursue
exit or effective noncompliance. As a candidate, President Trump
promised with respect to the Iran deal that he would “be so tough
on [Iran] and ultimately that deal will be broken unless they behave better than they’ve ever behaved in their lives, which is
probably unlikely.”160 Similarly, on climate, Trump promised during his campaign that “[w]e’re going to cancel the Paris Climate
Agreement and stop all payments of U.S. tax dollars to U.N.
global warming programs,” as well as to “rescind all the jobdestroying Obama executive actions, including the Climate
Action Plan.”161 It remains to be seen just how much Trump will
now follow through on these assertions, but he is currently pursuing them with vigor. There is no legal impediment to exiting

156

11 FAM § 723.3(7) (cited in note 69).
See Spiro, 79 Tex L Rev at 966, 1000–02 (cited in note 16).
158 Minamata Convention on Mercury Art 33, 55 ILM at 607.
159 See note 244 and accompanying text.
160 Transcript of Republican Presidential Candidates’ Debate in Miami (CNN, Mar
15, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/Z6VS-UKQG.
161 An America First Energy Plan (Donald J. Trump for President, May 26, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/2MMZ-4K45 (transcript of speech delivered by Trump in
Bismarck, North Dakota).
157
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the Iran deal, and Trump is reported to be interested in exit.162
While Trump cannot “cancel” the Paris Agreement immediately
as a matter of international law, he has already started rolling
back the Clean Action Plan and has announced his intention to
withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement (and not
to comply with it in the meantime).163 These examples illustrate
how future presidents can roll back the international commitments of their predecessors.
3. Using uncertainty constructively.
There is a great deal of uncertainty built into the current system with respect to constitutional law. The line that the executive
branch always needs some kind of preexisting or subsequent action from the Senate or Congress in order for the terms of international commitments to be implemented through domestic law
is only a rough one—in the claims-settlement context, for example, the Supreme Court has held that a sole executive agreement
does in fact constitute domestic law.164 Similarly, while the president has very broad constitutional authority to make nonbinding
commitments, the extent to which he or she can make international agreements without the specific approval of the Senate or
Congress remains deeply contested.165
This uncertainty gives the executive branch considerable
flexibility and probably promotes the long-term expansion of the
president’s constitutional authority through historical practice.
Yet at the same time it has a self-policing effect for whatever international commitment is presently at issue because it raises the
likelihood of resistance outside the executive branch (and possibly
within it, too). The more the executive branch seeks to make a
controversial international commitment without the specific approval of the legislature, the more it should anticipate pushback
not just with respect to the merits of the commitment but also
with respect to the process by which it was made. This in turn
should encourage the executive branch to be cautious. Perhaps
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See Sanger, Trump Seeks Way (cited in note 125).
See Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (cited in note 22)
(announcing that “as of today, the United States will cease all implementation” and that
it “is time to exit the Paris Accord”); Executive Order 13783 § 4, 82 Fed Reg 16093, 16095
(2017) (instructing the EPA administrator to seek to “suspend, revise, or rescind” the
Clean Power Plan).
164 See United States v Belmont, 301 US 324, 331 (1937).
165 See Part I.A.
163
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the Iran deal could constitutionally have been made as an agreement that was binding under international law.166 Perhaps the
Paris Agreement could have included binding emissions reduction targets, notwithstanding the positions taken by the executive
branch and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee years earlier
during the approval of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC).167 In opting for the less dramatic position, the
executive branch headed off stronger grounds for constitutional
contestation from within the executive branch, from Congress,
from the public, and potentially from the courts. As long as the
courts do not give their stamp of approval to international commitments that bypass the Senate or Congress, this self-policing
instinct should remain. This in turn leaves the executive branch
likely to continue to go to the Senate or Congress not just for international commitments that require changes in domestic law
for their implementation or for ones for which legislative buy-in
is especially important on the merits, but also for international
agreements that have exceptionally long time horizons or for
which there is a particularly strong tradition of obtaining specific
approval.
Of course, the executive branch will sometimes choose to provoke constitutional controversy, either out of a deliberate desire
to set a precedent or because its international objectives lead it to
take constitutionally controversial positions. When this happens,
however, the executive branch may be most vulnerable to resistance when it is also least constrained at the international legal level or the administrative-law level. ACTA provides a good
example. Opponents to this intellectual property agreement argued that the executive branch could not constitutionally join the
United States to it, even assuming all the requirements for its
domestic implementation were already provided for under
preexisting US law.168 Interwoven with these arguments, however, were complaints about the secrecy of the process by which
166 See David Golove, Congress Just Gave the President Power to Adopt a Binding
Legal Agreement with Iran (Just Security, May 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
7SH7-VZBB (arguing that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 unintentionally authorized the president as a matter of constitutional law to make a binding international legal agreement with Iran).
167 See notes 210–11 and accompanying text.
168 See, for example, Letter of Law Professors to the Senate Committee on Finance
(May 16, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/RMY8-NAG2; Hathaway and Kapczynski, Going It Alone (cited in note 37); Jack Goldsmith and Lawrence Lessig, Anti-Counterfeiting
Agreement Raises Constitutional Concerns (Wash Post, Mar 26, 2010), archived at http://
perma.cc/HBM2-F58R.
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ACTA was negotiated internationally,169 about its failure to go
through the C-175 Procedure in the usual way, and about the failure of the executive branch to provide a consistent and detailed
defense of its intent to bypass the Senate and Congress.170 Public
outcry against the secrecy of ACTA negotiations also occurred in
Europe, and the European Parliament declined to ratify it.171
Whether because of this decision in Europe or because of domestic
pressure, the Obama administration did not ratify ACTA, despite
having asserted its power to do so.
As this example suggests, the very existence of legal uncertainty itself acts as a further check to the current system. This
uncertainty both can act as a direct check on executive branch
overreaching and can empower the opponents of international
commitments in ways that further robust political debate and the
use of soft tools of democratic accountability. The more vulnerable
an international commitment is from the perspective of international legal checks and administrative-law checks, the more opponents of the international commitment may be able to draw
persuasively on constitutional concerns in the public arena and
perhaps also in the courts.
B.

Structural and Doctrinal Implications

Understanding the current system to be the product of three
strands of law has implications for ongoing structural and
doctrinal debates within the field of foreign relations law. This

169

See, for example, Hathaway and Kapczynski, Going It Alone (cited in note 37):

[N]egotiating partners complained to the United States about the unusual degree of secrecy, arguing that the level of confidentiality in these ACTA negotiations has been set at a higher level than is customary for non-security agreements and that the secrecy had inhibited consultation with those who would be
affected by the agreement.
See also, for example, Goldsmith and Lessig, Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement (cited in note
168) (“These mostly secret negotiations have already violated the Obama administration’s
pledge for greater transparency. . . . Congress should resist this attempt to evade the
checks established by our Framers.”).
170 Gwen Hinze, U.S. Law Professors Cast Further Doubt on ACTA’s Constitutionality—State Department Confirms No ACTA Pre-review (Electronic Frontier Foundation,
May 16, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/YX5S-45MA (noting that a FOIA request produced the response that no C-175 Memorandum was ever issued for ACTA and describing
the executive branch’s approach of first defending ACTA as a sole executive agreement
and then as an ex ante congressional-executive agreement as a “surprising about-face”).
171 Charles Arthur, ACTA Down but Not Out, as Europe Votes against Controversial
Treaty (The Guardian, July 4, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/GE5P-VEWC.
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Article has already shown descriptively how this system incorporates checks from all three strands and has offered a qualified
normative defense of this system. These descriptive and normative claims in turn have implications for three related debates:
first, whether international agreements that do not receive specific legislative approval need to be subject to more accountability
mechanisms; second, whether the Senate and Congress need to
put in place easier processes for providing legislative approval;
and third, how strong the president’s constitutional powers with
respect to negotiation and domestic implementation should be
understood to be.
1. Balancing accountability and flexibility.
As this Article has shown, international law and administrative law provide accountability mechanisms for international
commitments that executive branch actors make without getting
specific legislative approval. For major international commitments, international negotiations and subsequent compliance
procedures often provide for considerable transparency and opportunities for broader participation. On the domestic front, the
Case-Zablocki Act, the C-175 Procedure, any laws specific to agencies involved in international negotiations, and now Executive
Order 13609 all further accountability, as do the limits that come
with the implementation process and the tools of soft power that
members of Congress can invoke.
Professor Hathaway has argued that existing measures are
not enough and that there needs to be stronger oversight of all
international agreements that do not receive the specific approval
of the Senate or Congress.172 She suggests multiple reforms for all
such agreements, including that they be provided to Congress
before they enter into force, that the State Department be public
and specific about the constitutional justification for the pathway that it uses for each agreement, and that Congress pass an
APA-like statute providing for public opportunity for notice and
comment during the negotiation of international agreements.173
Hathaway’s proposals amount to effortful remedies to a
mostly nonexistent problem. In her view, the entire system needs
reform not because it is producing bad agreements, but because
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Hathaway, 119 Yale L J at 239–53 (cited in note 55).
Id. These proposed remedies are effectively administrative-law solutions to
Hathaway’s concern about excessive presidential power.
173
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the president has too much power and too little oversight. This
position in turn rests on her perspective that the president acts
“alone” and “almost entirely unfettered.”174 Hathaway focuses on
the checks that exist from a constitutional perspective and thus
does not take into account the existing constraints that come with
the international legal process or with the involvement of agencies, who are in turn accountable not only to the president but
also to Congress, the courts, and their own constituencies. The
steps she recommends would come at a real cost, in both money
and time, to the executive branch for the hundreds of international agreements (mostly minor ones) that it makes every year.
This in turn would probably have the effect of incentivizing executive branch actors more toward nonbinding commitments, which
are not subject to Hathaway’s proposals. Of course, this could be
addressed by trying to tighten oversight with regard to nonbinding commitments—but that would require more time, cost, and hassle, and thus have a deterrent effect on international cooperation.
Retail fixes offer a better way of dealing with accountability
concerns than do wholesale ones. The type and strengths of constraints vary across specific contexts at both the international
and domestic levels. Negotiations of new international agreements that are occurring under UN auspices will have greater
transparency and opportunities for participation than will regional trade agreements. International commitments that are to
be implemented by authority previously delegated to the president will have fewer administrative-law safeguards than ones to
be implemented by authority delegated to agencies. Some administrative agencies involved in international cooperation operate
with less congressional scrutiny than do others.175 Context will determine how good the balance is in any particular situation, and
calls for reform should therefore be contextually grounded.
One retail fix that the executive branch could undertake on
its own or with the encouragement of Congress would be to make
public its legal reasoning on the constitutionality of especially significant international agreements for which it does not obtain
specific legislative approval. The Obama administration was public with regard to its legal analysis on many sensitive national
174

Id at 144–45.
Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy 165–68 (Princeton 2015) (showing that there is considerable variation with how answerable agencies engaged in foreign affairs are to Congress and
finding in particular that agencies involved in military affairs are typically less answerable).
175
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security issues. Through speeches, testimony, and the release of
legal memoranda, it explained its legal positions with respect to
issues as sensitive as the use of force in Libya176 and the targeted
killing abroad of American citizens.177 Yet when asked for the legal reasoning behind its claim that the United States could join
ACTA without the specific approval of the Senate or Congress, the
administration gave brief and somewhat conflicting responses.178
By making its legal reasoning clearer for major international
agreements, the administration would be providing another
venue for administrative-law principles of transparency and accountability, even as over time such transparency would probably
strengthen its constitutional arguments as a matter of historical
practice.
2. Making legislative approval easier.
The current system will be with us for the foreseeable future.
This is true not only with respect to the many international commitments that do not receive specific approval from the Senate or
Congress, but also for the pathways that do require such specific
approval, including treaties and ex post congressional-executive
agreements. The executive branch will continue to make treaties
and ex post congressional-executive agreements when changes to
domestic law are needed for implementation, when there is a particular desire for domestic support, when there is a need to signal
to other nations the seriousness of the US commitment, and
when, for certain types of agreements, long-standing practice perhaps amounting to constitutional law effectively requires legislative approval.
Right now, obtaining legislative approval for international
agreements is a deeply unpredictable process. This is true not
only with respect to whether the votes will be there to support a
particular agreement, but also with respect to whether and when
the agreement can get through all the procedural veto gates in
order to receive a floor vote. Right now, most major international
176 Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric Holder, Attorney General, Authority to Use Military
Force in Libya 12 (Apr 1, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/C2W7-ZJXN; Libya and War
Powers, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong, 1st Sess
11 (2011) (statement of Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser, US Department of State).
177 See generally Department of Justice White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an
Associated Force (Nov 8, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/X2XD-W2CK.
178 Hinze, U.S. Law Professors Cast Further Doubt (cited in note 170).
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agreements that require specific legislative approval go to the
Senate as treaties and can further require the passage of implementing legislation from Congress.179 It can take years or decades
for these treaties to receive floor votes or for the passage of their
implementing legislation.180 The only major category of international agreements that has gone to Congress for approval as ex
post congressional-executive agreements in recent years is trade
agreements.181 In practice, the ability of these agreements to receive a floor vote depends on whether or not there is preexisting
“fast-track” legislation that guarantees a speedy vote for these
agreements.182 Such legislation has existed on and off over the
years; the present version applies for the next handful of years.183
In recent years, scholars have made numerous proposals for
making the treaty process and the ex post congressional-executive
agreement process more efficient. For treaties, the Senate’s
advice-and-consent process could provide conditional prenegotiation approval184 or set up a fast-track process.185 The Senate could
also take steps to reduce or eliminate the need for implementing
legislation,186 or alternatively Congress could streamline the process for passing it.187 For ex post congressional-executive agreements, Congress could provide a long-term fast-track option for
all agreements.188
The alternatives to treaties described in this Article offer reasons why the Senate and Congress should be willing to consider
these moves. The harder it is for the executive branch to get specific approval from the Senate and Congress—and the more
uncertainty there is about this process—the more incentives the
179 Jean Galbraith, Making Treaty Implementation More Like Statutory Interpretation, 115 Mich L Rev 1309, 1319–20 (2017).
180 Id at 1322–23.
181 See Hathaway, 119 Yale L J at 150 n 16 (cited in note 55) (finding only nine ex
post congressional-executive agreements made between 1980 and 2000, most of which related to trade).
182 This was understood, for example, to be “a vital prerequisite” to the TPP. Jonathan
Weisman, Trade Authority Bill Wins Final Approval in Senate (NY Times, June 24, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/4MDW-934J.
183 Id (noting that this fast-track process will apply to agreements negotiated in the
six years following the most recent enactment).
184 Galbraith, 37 Yale J Intl L at 249–51 (cited in note 90).
185 Ronald A. Lehmann, Note, Reinterpreting Advice and Consent: A Congressional
Fast Track for Arms Control Treaties, 98 Yale L J 885, 896–97 (1989).
186 Galbraith, 115 Mich L Rev at 1358–59 (cited in note 179).
187 John F. Coyle, The Case for Writing International Law into the U.S. Code, 56 BC
L Rev 433, 482–84 (2015).
188 Hathaway, 117 Yale L J at 1352–54 (cited in note 16).
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executive branch has to try to structure an international commitment in ways that allow it to bypass specific approval entirely. As
Goldsmith wrote toward the end of the Obama administration,
“Senate, Congress, wake up and pay attention!”189 If the Senate or
Congress wants more of a role, then they need to bring either carrots or sticks to bear—and, because of the president’s veto power,
carrots are more likely to succeed as legislation than sticks.
Easier legislative approval would have advantages not only
for the institutional power of the Senate and Congress, but also
for US interests more generally. It would offer the executive
branch more flexibility in international negotiations, as it would
have more reason to think itself able to obtain congressional approval and thus more reason to pursue terms that would require
changes to US domestic law. It would also make it easier to negotiate agreements aimed at changing the superstructure of international law. The major international agreements that define the
international legal system may need updating over time, and legislative approval would be important to such endeavors.
3. Retaining checks in negotiation and implementation.
This Article has defended the diminishment of specific legislative approval for international commitments largely on the
grounds that alternative constraints exist with respect to the negotiation and implementation of these commitments. One further
set of implications from this Article, therefore, is that especially
strong constitutional claims of presidential power in these domains should be resisted.
With regard to negotiations, the executive branch has long favored the sweeping language from United States v Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp190 that “the President alone has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the nation . . . he alone negotiates.”191 In a soft form, this is undeniably correct: the president
and his or her agents act internationally for the United States.
But this language should not be taken to mean that members of
Congress, independent regulatory agencies, and US states cannot
constitutionally share their own positions with respect to international negotiations and even directly with negotiators from other
189 Jack Goldsmith, The Obama Administration’s Contributions to International Law
(Lawfare, June 28, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/SH3P-2J9Vhttp://perma.cc/SH3P
-2J9V?type=image.
190 299 US 304 (1936).
191 Id at 319.
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countries. The letter authored by Senator Cotton and many other
Republican senators to the “Leaders of the Islamic Republic of
Iran”192 may have been unprecedented and an exercise of poor
judgment, but, contra to the view of then–Secretary of State John
Kerry, it should not be considered “unconstitutional.”193 Instead,
it should be viewed as an example of how the institutional powers
exercised by members of Congress may change over time as counterweights to developments in the president’s power to choose.
The Supreme Court has recently signaled an interest in rolling
back the strong language from Curtiss-Wright.194 Such an approach would promote the structural checks and balances discussed in this Article.
Turning to implementation, as discussed earlier, the president typically needs the Senate or Congress in order to implement
international commitments that require the alteration of domestic law. But this line is a rough one. In the claims-settlement context, for example, the Supreme Court has held that sole executive
agreements—and even presidential policy—can preempt state
law.195 In addition, the Supreme Court has recently held that the
president has the exclusive power of recognizing foreign nations,196 and it therefore seems logical that decisions and international commitments made by the president with regard to
recognition should have effect as domestic law.197 Outside of these
contexts, though, the analysis in this Article suggests that courts
should energetically resist attempts to treat international commitments that do not have the clear approval of Congress as domestic law or as preempting state law. In addition, given the useful structural role that state and local governments can play as a
counterweight to presidential power, courts should be wary of

192 Cotton, et al, Open Letter (cited in note 98). For purposes of this discussion, I assume that the Logan Act, 1 Stat 613 (1799), codified at 18 USC § 953, is unlikely to serve
as a meaningful bar to international engagement by governmental actors outside the executive branch.
193 Transcript of Face the Nation (CBS News, Mar 15, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/K2GU-JXQS (quoting Kerry for the proposition that the letter is “contrary to the
Constitution with respect to the executive’s right to negotiate” and “unconstitutional”).
194 See note 95 (discussing the mixed signals sent in Zivotofsky).
195 Belmont, 301 US at 331; American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US
396, 413–20 (2003).
196 See Zivotofsky v Kerry, 135 S Ct 2076, 2088 (2015).
197 This is reinforced by the fact that some of the claims-settlement cases, including
Belmont, were closely tied to recognition decisions.
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strong attempts to box these actors out of engagement with foreign affairs.198
With respect to international and administrative law, however, courts need not be as concerned about giving some leeway
to the executive branch in implementation. Courts typically defer
to the executive branch with respect to the interpretation both of
international law and administrative statutes. In practice, however, courts have considerable flexibility in terms of how much
deference they actually give, and this flexibility gives them another tool of control over executive branch overreaching.199 With
the move toward international commitments that do not receive
specific legislative approval but will be implemented through
preexisting administrative law, one interesting question is
whether courts should pay any attention to the international commitment in reviewing agency actions taken under the authority
of the preexisting statute. While courts should be wary of applying a strong version of the Charming Betsy canon200 in these contexts, a touch of added deference seems appropriate.201

198 For scholarship urging resistance to expansive executive power with respect to
implementation and preemption, see, for example, Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the
“One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 Vill L Rev 975, 995 (2001); David H. Moore,
Beyond One Voice, 98 Minn L Rev 953, 1017–32 (2014); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations
Federalism, 70 U Colo L Rev 1223, 1259–70 (1999). For discussion of how state and local
governments interact with the federal government with respect to foreign affairs, see generally Jean Galbraith, Book Review, Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism, 130 Harv L Rev 2131 (2017).
199 A draft of the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, for example, signals this flexibility by stating that US courts “will ordinarily give
great weight to an interpretation [of a treaty] by the executive branch.” Restatement
(Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 106 (April 2015 Discussion
Draft) (emphasis added). This language is more flexible than that of the Restatement
(Third). See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 326(2) (1987) (stating that courts “will give great weight to an interpretation made by
the Executive Branch”). With respect to administrative law, “agencies seeking to defend
statutory interpretations in court can anticipate with confidence neither what standard
[of deference] will be applied nor how the court will apply it.” Jud Mathews, Deference
Lotteries, 91 Tex L Rev 1349, 1351 (2013) (discussing the scholarship on this issue). See
also William N. Eskridge Jr and Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
Georgetown L J 1083, 1091 (2008) (concluding that “there is no clear guide as to when the
Court will invoke particular deference regimes, and why”).
200 Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 US (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.”).
201 See Galbraith and Zaring, 99 Cornell L Rev at 773–75, 790–92 (cited in note 7).
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IV. THE PARIS AGREEMENT AS A CASE STUDY
In his last year in office, President Obama joined the United
States to the Paris Agreement on climate without the explicit approval of either the Senate or Congress.202 This decision showcases the dynamics described in this Article. On the one hand, it
demonstrates how constitutional constraints on the approval of
international agreements have eroded in modern times. Indeed,
it was called “outrageous,” “unlawful,” and “a clear example of the
executive overreach in the area of foreign affairs.”203 On the other
hand, when the negotiation and implementation of the Paris
Agreement are taken into account, it is apparent that Obama
acted under powerful constraints arising from the conjunction of
international law, constitutional law, and administrative law. As
subsequent events are already revealing, his actions remain
deeply vulnerable to resistance and reversal.
Overall, the Paris Agreement demonstrates just how important the availability of multiple pathways to making international commitments has become to the functioning of foreign relations law. For those convinced of the urgent need for action with
respect to climate change, it also illustrates the value of this diversity of pathways. This Part first briefly sets the Paris
Agreement in the broader context of US participation in climate
negotiations. It then describes the web of checks on Obama’s uses
of power that have arisen or will arise with respect to its negotiation, approval, and implementation.
A.

From Rio to Paris

In 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed the UNFCCC at
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.204 Finalized earlier that year,
the UNFCCC had both substantive and procedural elements.
Substantively, it committed state parties to taking steps to combat climate change but left vague many aspects relating to the
content of these steps.205 Procedurally, it set up an institutional
and legal framework for the conduct of future negotiations about

202

See Eilperin, Obama Hails ‘Historic’ Ratification (cited in note 9).
House Executive Overreach Task Force Hearing, 114th Cong, 2d Sess at 2 (cited in
note 17) (statement of Rep King).
204 William K. Stevens, With Climate Treaty Signed, All Say They’ll Do Even More
(NY Times, June 13, 1992), archived at http://perma.cc/6JXV-HUTP.
205 See UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Art 4, 1771 UNTS 107, 170
(June 4, 1992, entered into force Mar 21, 1994) (“UNFCCC”).
203
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climate change, including through the establishment of a
Conference of Parties that would hold annual meetings.206
Bush then submitted the UNFCCC to the Senate for advice
and consent.207 This was the easy and obvious choice. As a matter
of politics, obtaining the Senate’s approval was straightforward.
Both Democrats and Republicans wanted it done before the 1992
elections, and the treaty received the Senate’s advice and consent
with astonishing speed—within a mere month of its submission.208 As a matter of law, treating the UNFCCC as a treaty put
it on unquestionable constitutional footing and was consistent
with how the recent Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer and related protocols had been treated.209
During the advice-and-consent process, actors in both the executive branch and the Senate considered what domestic pathway
would be appropriate for future protocols to the UNFCCC. The
administration stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that “we would expect” a future “protocol containing targets and
timetables [to] be submitted to the Senate” for advice and consent.210 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated in its
committee report that a “decision . . . to adopt targets and timetables would have to be submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent.”211
Between 1992 and 2009, however, two important developments dramatically changed the incentives for a president concerned about climate change to return to the Senate with a substantive treaty. First, what had been merely predictable became
painstakingly obvious: getting domestic approval for a treaty that
provided for strong substantive action on climate change would

206

UNFCCC Arts 7–18, 1771 UNTS at 176–85.
Transmission of UN Framework Convention on Climate Change for the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, 102d Cong, 2d Sess, in 138 Cong Rec 23902 (Sept 8, 1992).
208 Resolution of Ratification of UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 102d
Cong, 2d Sess, in 138 Cong Rec 33527 (Oct 7, 1992).
209 See David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker’s Challenge: Marrying International Law and
American Environmental Law, 32 Va J Intl L 377, 400 (1992).
210 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong, 2d Sess 106 (1992) (“Responses of the Administration to Questions Asked by the Foreign Relations Committee”) (stating when asked about
protocols more generally that “[w]e would expect” them to be submitted to the Senate but
that “given that a protocol could be adopted on any number of subjects, treatment of any
given protocol would depend on its subject matter”).
211 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, S Rep No 102-55, 102d
Cong, 2d Sess 14 (1992).
207
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be about as easy as getting a camel through the eye of the proverbial needle. Two-thirds of the Senate would never back such a
treaty under a Democratic president, and no Republican president would put such a treaty forward. During the Clinton administration, this was manifested by the failure of the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol, which had no chance in the Senate.212 In the George W.
Bush era, this was made clear by the administration’s underwhelming interest in addressing climate change.213
The second important change was the Supreme Court’s 5–4
decision in Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency.214
The Court held that, contrary to the views taken by the Bush II
administration, the Clean Air Act permitted and indeed effectively obligated the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.215
Although this decision was purely about the interpretation of the
Clean Air Act, it had major implications for international commitments. Most importantly, it meant that the EPA could now implement an international commitment that required domestic action, as long as this domestic action followed proper procedures
and lay within the substantive scope of its now-clarified authority
under the Clean Air Act.
Obama thus came into office with a pathway for implementing a negotiated climate commitment domestically in a way that
would not require congressional legislation. Consistent with the
long time horizons associated with the negotiation of major international agreements, only when the Paris Agreement was
reached in December 2015 was this pathway fully realized.216
B.

Paris and Presidential Power

The Paris Agreement reveals both the opportunities and limits of the president’s power to choose. Obama described it as “historic,” as “ambitious,” as “establish[ing] the enduring framework
the world needs to solve the climate crisis,” and overall as something that “can be a turning point for the world.”217 So much was
acknowledged to be at stake—yet Obama chose not to go to the
212

See Galbraith, 37 Yale J Intl L at 303–04 (cited in note 90).
See John R. Crook, ed, Note, U.S. Positions in International Climate Change Negotiations, 102 Am J Intl L 155, 166 (2008).
214 549 US 497 (2007).
215 Id at 528–35.
216 An earlier nonbinding commitment done in 2009 at the UNFCCC Conference of
the Parties at Copenhagen was in part a precursor to the Paris Agreement. See
Copenhagen Accord (Dec 18, 2009), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 4–7.
217 Statement by the President on the Paris Climate Agreement (cited in note 19).
213
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Senate or to Congress for approval. More than that, he bypassed
the Senate and Congress precisely because the issue was so important and the odds of legislative approval were so low. Focusing
just on the approval process, this seems like a quintessential example of unchecked presidential power. But a close look at the
international, constitutional, and administrative legal issues underlying the negotiation, approval, and implementation of the
Paris Agreement reveals a very different story. In actuality, the
Obama administration was so hemmed in on every front that the
Paris Agreement amounted to an improbable and brilliant success. The acts of the Trump administration to date suggest that
this success may prove to be a fleeting one.
1. Negotiation.
In negotiating the Paris Agreement, the Obama administration had to contend not only with the constraints accompanying
the negotiating process but also with those that it foresaw arising
with respect to approval and implementation. This is true for all
international commitments (as Part II described), but what is unusual about the Paris Agreement is just how formidable all of
these constraints were. As a matter of international law, the negotiating process was designed to be incredibly cumbersome. The
negotiations took place as part of the UNFCCC Conference of the
Parties, and, under the applicable rules of procedure, the nearly
two hundred negotiating states need to reach consensus in order
to make an agreement.218 This challenging requirement was further complicated by all the differences between nations that climate change brings out—differences that go to who bears the
greatest historic responsibility, who has the most capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and/or support carbon sinks, and
who is most steeply suffering the effects of climate change. All
these factors help explain the painfully slow progression of negotiations under the UNFCCC process.
By the time of the Paris Agreement, the accretion of prior negotiating decisions made through the UNFCCC process limited
what could be done at Paris. One of these limiting prior decisions
involved the legal form which could be used for a commitment. In
2011, the Conference of the Parties had agreed in their annual
218 For an overview of the complexities of the consensus requirement, see Alan Boyle
and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Climate Change and International Law beyond the UNFCCC,
in Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Kevin R. Gray, and Richard G. Tarasofsky, eds, The Oxford
Handbook of International Climate Change Law 26, 37–39 (Oxford 2016).
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negotiations that the future commitment would be “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.”219 The Obama administration agreed to this formulation in return for a major
substantive concession,220 but in return it had to forgo the domestic constitutional advantages that would have come with having
the future instrument be nonbinding under international law. In
other words, by the time the Conference at Paris came around,
the president’s negotiators were committed internationally to a
process that gave up his easiest domestic constitutional path to
approval.221
Domestic-law considerations also tightly channeled the scope
of negotiating possibilities for the Obama administration. Thinking ahead to approval, the administration knew it needed an
agreement that it could join without the Senate or Congress—
first, as a matter of constitutional law; second, as a matter of the
C-175 process; and third, despite the legislative history from the
Senate’s advice and consent to the UNFCCC. Thinking ahead to
implementation, the administration knew it needed an agreement whose terms could at least theoretically be implemented
through a combination of the president’s independent constitutional powers and preexisting delegations by Congress to administrative agencies and US states, most notably in the Clean Air Act.
As a matter of process, this meant that the Obama administration did not even try to leave the Paris negotiations solely in
the hands of traditional diplomats. The EPA played a particularly
prominent role in the negotiations—Administrator Gina
McCarthy spent the entire week in Paris222—but many other

219 Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban
from 28 November to 11 December 2011: Part Two, UNFCCC Conference of the Parties,
17th sess (Dec 11, 2011), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 2.
220 Daniel Bodansky, The Durban Platform Negotiations: Goal and Options *2 (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, July 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3GZY-QASR
(explaining that “[t]he United States insisted that it would accept a mandate to negotiate
a new outcome of a legal nature only if the mandate was ‘symmetrical’ in its application
to developing as well as developed countries”).
221 The Obama administration did use nonbinding commitments as supplements to
the Paris negotiations, such as a bilateral commitment made with China a year before the
Paris Conference. See U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change (White House
Office of the Press Secretary, Nov 12, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7B39-MZ6S.
222 For details of her role there, see U.S. Environmental Regulation after the Paris
Climate Talks: A Conversation with Gina McCarthy (Council on Foreign Relations, Jan 7,
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/FL42-ZFKD.
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agencies were represented as well.223 Nor were actors outside of
the executive branch shy about making their voices heard.
Congressional committees and subcommittees held hearings in
the weeks leading up to Paris224—including one hearing convened
by Senator Ted Cruz—and members of both the House and the
Senate made appearances at Paris. Representatives from nongovernmental organizations in both industry and environment similarly turned up in force at Paris.225 So did a large contingent from
the government of California; Governor Jerry Brown made multiple international commitments just before and during the conference.226 These external forces did not alter the executive
branch’s formal control over US negotiations, but they did make
the overall process more participatory and more scrutinized.
As a matter of substance, the domestic constraints mentioned
above tied the Obama administration’s negotiating hands with
respect to two central issues under negotiation: first, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and, second, money. On the
issue of emissions reductions, the Obama administration needed
to avoid making an internationally legally binding commitment

223 See Provisional List of Participants, UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 21st sess
(Dec 1, 2015), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/MISC.2 40–43 (listing representatives from not only
the White House and the State Department, but also the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, Energy, the Interior, and the Treasury, the EPA, Office of the US Trade Representative, US Agency for International Development, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Forest Service, as well as participants from Congress and
its staff).
224 See generally, for example, Examining the International Climate Negotiations,
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 114th Cong, 1st
Sess (2015) (“Senate Hearing on Examining Climate Negotiations”); Pitfalls of Unilateral
Negotiations at the Paris Climate Change Conference, Hearing before the House Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, 114th Cong, 1st Sess (2015); Valerie Richardson, Republicans Move to Undermine Obama on Paris Climate Deal (Wash Times, Dec 7, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/CA8G-MB3R (describing the hearing convened by Senator Ted
Cruz).
225 See Provisional List of Participants at 2 (cited in note 223) (noting over seven thousand registered participants from NGOs).
226 See David Siders, Jerry Brown Wants All New Cars in California Zero-Emission
by 2050 (Sacramento Bee, Dec 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R3W3-SJD7 (discussing a political commitment for future zero-emission cars made between California, Germany, the United Kingdom, New York, and several other sovereigns); UN Climate Conference: Governor Brown, German Government Announce 43 New Signatories to Under 2
MOU Climate Pact (California Office of the Governor, Dec 9, 2015), archived at http://
perma.cc/2PPZ-8QMW (mentioning, among other things, a joint declaration with France);
Chris Megerian, California Isn’t a Country, so Why Are So Many in the State Headed to
Climate Talks in Paris? (LA Times, Dec 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5QM7-XGK2
(describing the sizeable California contingent, which included Brown, eight state legislators, and “a number of top Brown administration officials”).
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to reduce emissions and, especially, to avoid such a commitment
with respect to specified targets. A legally binding commitment to
reduce emissions would have put the Paris Agreement on thinner
ice as a matter of constitutional law, though still defensible and
also consistent with the approach taken in some earlier environmental agreements.227 Moreover, it would have been in tension
with the legislative history associated with the Senate’s advice
and consent to the UNFCCC, when the executive branch had signaled that it would submit any future protocol with targets and
timetables as a treaty.228 Combined, these two factors would have
made it difficult and perhaps impossible for the State Department
to conclude through the C-175 process that no subsequent approval from the Senate or Congress was needed.
The Obama administration resolved this challenge by insisting that the Paris Agreement not contain any legally binding commitments to reduce emissions. Instead, the Agreement requires
each nation to set a nationally determined contribution (NDC)
that it “intends to achieve.”229 Nations are legally obligated to
“prepare, communicate and maintain” these NDCs, but they are
not legally obligated to meet them.230 Structuring the Paris
Agreement this way required expert legal work, with careful distinctions drawn between language meant to signify internationally legally binding commitments (most notably “shall”) and language meant to signify nonbinding aspects of the agreement (for
example, “should,” “aim,” and “are encouraged”). The importance
of these distinctions to presidential negotiators was highlighted
by a dramatic last-minute change. The initial final text of
227 Compare Senate Hearing on Examining Climate Negotiations, 114th Cong 1st Sess
at 8 (cited in note 224) (testimony of Professor Julian Ku) (“I don’t believe the Constitution
allows the President to use a sole executive agreement . . . to legally bind the United States
to particular greenhouse gas emissions targets.”), with Wirth, 39 Harv Envir L Rev at
552–61 (cited in note 37) (noting various precedents for making sole executive agreements
with substantive requirements that could be fulfilled under existing domestic environmental law, including the 2013 Minamata Convention, a 1991 bilateral agreement with Canada, the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, and three of that
Convention’s subsequent protocols).
228 See Responses of the Administration to Questions Asked by the Foreign Relations
Committee, 102d Cong, 2d Sess at 106 (cited in note 210).
229 Paris Agreement Art 4(2) (opened for signature Apr 22, 2016), archived at http://
perma.cc/2BXZ-DK7W. The Paris Agreement does use the legally binding language “shall”
for some substantive commitments—for example, it states that the “Parties shall pursue
domestic mitigation measures,” but, instead of requiring any particular type of commitment, it then simply specifies that these measures will have “the aim of achieving the
objectives of” the NDCs. Paris Agreement Art 4(2) (emphasis added).
230 See Paris Agreement Art 4(2).
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Article 4(4) stated that: “Developed country Parties shall continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute
emission reduction targets.”231 Horrified and believing that this
language was introduced in error, US negotiators insisted that
the word “should” be substituted for “shall.” Secretary Kerry said
in essence that, “Either it changes, or President Obama and the
United States will not be able to support this agreement.” 232 In
the final moments, the change was made, nominally as a correction to a drafting error.233
Another key domestic constraint related to money. Part of the
core climate deal is for developing countries to receive very large
amounts of financial support for their efforts to combat climate
change. In the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations, the commitment
that was reached set specified levels of support that developed
countries would mobilize for developing countries—levels which
were to rise to the overall sum of $100 billion a year by 2020.234 At
Paris, the developing countries wanted this commitment made in
a legally binding way. While the Obama administration could be
sure of its ability to provide some seed money to developing countries,235 it could not be sure a successor administration would do
so, and it certainly could not commit to large, continuing contributions at a level that would require congressional appropriations. The Obama administration thus had strong reasons for
wanting to avoid any international legal obligation to commit
meaningful sums of money to developing countries. Looking to approval, such an obligation would strengthen the constitutional
concerns about bypassing the Senate and Congress;236 and looking
231 See Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Proposal by the President, Draft Decision,
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 21st sess (Dec 12, 2015), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9
21 (emphasis added).
232 Warrick, How One Word Nearly Killed the Climate Deal (cited in note 20) (quoting
Kerry’s description of his conversation with the Conference President).
233 See John Vidal, How a ‘Typo’ Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate Deal (The Guardian, Dec 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/S8LZ-H8GC (describing this sharply contentious issue).
234 See Copenhagen Accord at 7 (cited in note 216).
235 In 2016, for example, the Obama administration provided $500 million for this
purpose using discretionary funding. Timothy Cama, Obama Pays $500M to UN Climate
Change Fund (The Hill, Mar 3, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/32T2-KFUF.
236 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 222–23 (cited in note 11) (discussing a 1969 Senate
resolution expressing the view that a sole executive agreement should not “promise to
assist a foreign country . . . by the use of the . . . financial resources of the United States”).
Although this resolution does not formally bind the president, it does signal the need to
tread especially cautiously as a matter of constitutional law when financial commitments
are concerned. See id.
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to implementation, it would be close to impossible to meet such
an obligation without affirmative support from Congress. In the
end, negotiators once again struck a delicate balance. The Paris
Agreement itself states that “[d]eveloped country Parties shall
provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties,”237 but it does not specify the amounts for which developed
countries (let alone individual countries among them) are responsible. Instead, the $100-billion-a-year figure from Copenhagen
was reiterated only in a separate conference decision that accompanied the Paris Agreement.238
As all this suggests, the Obama administration had very limited space for maneuvering in the Paris negotiations. Its hands
were tied not only by political constraints, but also by legal ones.
From international law, it had to contend with layers and layers
of international process and with the substantive limits locked in
by previous negotiations. On the domestic side, its constraints did
not come from asserted claims about what the Senate or Congress
would approve, as it was clear that they were not going to end up
approving the Paris Agreement. Instead, these domestic constraints derived from the limited scope of what could be done in
the absence of the Senate or Congress. That these constraints
were strong and credible is shown by how much the Paris
Agreement was tailored to accommodate them.
2. Approval.
As the discussion above shows, concerns about domestic approval folded into the negotiating process. Although the international legal backdrop prevented the climate commitment from being entirely nonbinding, the Obama administration succeeded in
negotiating an agreement that it considered it could join without
subsequent approval from the Senate as a treaty or Congress as
an ex post congressional-executive agreement. It did so by insisting that the aspects of the agreement most vulnerable to constitutional concern be made nonbinding or nonspecific. The end result is an agreement that illustrates Professor Koh’s observation
that “we are now moving to a whole host of less crystalline, more
nuanced forms of international legal engagement and cooperation
that do not fall neatly within any of the[ ] three pigeonholes” of

237

Paris Agreement Art 9(1).
Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 21st sess
(Jan 29, 2016), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 8, 17 at ¶¶ 53, 114.
238
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treaty, congressional-executive agreement, and sole executive
agreement.239 Obama made the Paris Agreement mainly on his
own constitutional authority, but he was buttressed in doing so
by the fact that this Agreement furthers both the preexisting
UNFCCC and the goals underlying the Clean Air Act. The expert
lawyering that enabled the Obama administration to walk this
line sparked admiration from former Bush administration lawyers John Bellinger and Goldsmith.240
The Paris Agreement illustrates the broader overall shift described in this Article from constitutional checks to administrative ones. Despite its careful crafting to minimize constitutional
concerns, it will probably be viewed broadly by future administrations as a historical practice justifying sweeping constitutional
powers of the president to make sole executive agreements when
the commitments made in these agreements can be implemented
through preexisting domestic law.241 Yet it may also lead in the
long run to changes to the C-175 Procedure in ways that make it
less opaque and perhaps more regularized. Intriguingly, at a 2016
congressional hearing involving the Paris Agreement, one witness who was asserting that the Paris Agreement should go to the
Senate based this claim on the C-175 Procedure factors far more
than on the Constitution.242 To the interest of several present representatives, he argued for more transparency to the C-175
Procedure.243 The more the president is unconstrained constitutionally with regard to approval, the more such administrativelaw principles may come to the fore.

239 Koh, 101 Georgetown L J at 726 (cited in note 14). See also Bodansky and Spiro,
49 Vand J Transnatl L at 887 (cited in note 37) (describing international agreements that
are supported but not specifically authorized by Congress as “executive agreements+”).
240 See Chris Mooney and Juliet Eilperin, Obama’s Rapid Move to Join the Paris Climate Agreement Could Tie Up the Next President (Wash Post, Apr 11, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/9G4G-VG8H (quoting Bellinger); Goldsmith, 57 Harv Intl L J at 466–67,
469–72 (cited in note 37).
241 See Galbraith, 99 Va L Rev at 1042–45 (cited in note 82) (describing how the executive branch tends to read its past practices broadly). While President Trump has announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, so far he has
not repudiated Obama’s legal authority to have made the commitment in the first place.
See Nick Juliano, What Does Trump’s Paris Climate Decision Mean? (Politico, May 31,
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4MUW-JH5V (noting that “Trump apparently decided
not to treat the Paris deal as a treaty and submit it for a Senate ratification vote, which
would surely fail”).
242 See House Executive Overreach Task Force Hearing, 114th Cong, 2d Sess at 43–
44, 48–52, 59, 63–68 (cited in note 17) (testimony of Steven Groves).
243 See id at 59, 64–68.
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3. Implementation.
The decision to forgo the unachievable approval of the Senate
or Congress left Obama in a fragile position with regard to implementation. As a matter of international law, he locked the next
administration into the Paris Agreement for four years from its
entry into force, unless the Trump administration wishes to invoke a one-year route that is available if it also withdraws from
the UNFCCC.244 As a matter of domestic law, however, Obama’s
ability to have the Paris Agreement implemented depended in the
immediate future on the EPA and the federal courts—and in the
longer term on the next administration, on future Congresses,
and on the international legal process. In short, as in the negotiations, the President’s powers were curtailed on all sides.
Most immediately, in relying on the Clean Air Act for implementation of the NDC submitted by the United States, Obama
necessarily accepted the process and limits that come with that
Act. He thus became dependent on the EPA, which in turn must
act within the constraints of the Clean Air Act and the APA.245 In
June 2014, the EPA provided for notice and comment a proposed
rule known as the Clean Power Plan. This proposed rule sought
to reduce emissions from existing power plants and gave considerable flexibility to state agencies with regard to implementation.246 After the receipt of over four million comments, the EPA
issued its final rule in the fall of 2015.247 This rule was arguably
crucial to the ability of the United States to meet its NDC.248 But
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Paris Agreement Art 28; UNFCCC Art 25, 1771 UNTS at 187.
In addition, the EPA has institutional reasons to be attentive to congressional concerns in determining how far it is willing to go both in its legal interpretations and its uses
of discretion. See Devin Henry, Spending Bill Keeps EPA Funding Flat in 2016 (The Hill,
Dec 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/AG4D-T95X (describing the failure of attempts
to tie the EPA budget to the absence of climate action but noting that, overall, “[t]he bill
keeps agency staffing levels at their lowest level since 1989”).
246 See Bulman-Pozen, 102 Va L Rev at 966–67, 982–87 (cited in note 139) (describing
the functional federalism in this rule). The Clean Power Plan is not the only action the
EPA is taking with respect to climate change, but it is the most significant to date. See A
Conversation with Gina McCarthy (cited in note 222).
247 See generally Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan by the Numbers (EPA), archived at
http://perma.cc/F3GU-P33D; Environmental Protection Agency, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed
Reg 64662 (2015), amending 40 CFR Part 60. This rule was thus finalized before the completion of the Paris negotiations.
248 See Cary Coglianese, When Management-Based Regulation Goes Global (RegBlog,
Dec 23, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T8LE-BM7K. It is possible that the United
States could meet its NDC without the Clean Power Plan due to other factors, such as tax
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over twenty states and countless other parties challenged many
aspects of the rule, and the Supreme Court stayed its implementation during this litigation by a 5–4 vote just a few days before
the death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February 2016.249
This challenge to implementation would have awaited even a
successor to Obama who was friendly to the Paris Agreement. So
too would other challenges. At the international level, the Paris
Agreement left many issues to the complex and ongoing negotiating process, including aspects of such crucial matters as increased
emissions reduction, compliance, and funding. At the domestic
level, congressional support would have been needed in the long
run for funding purposes, so as to support developing countries in
pursuing emission reductions.
The first year of the Trump administration has illustrated yet
another check on Obama’s power with respect to the Paris
Agreement: the ability of a future president to roll back the commitments of his or her predecessor. Shortly after taking office,
President Trump instructed his EPA administrator to review the
Clean Power Plan and “if appropriate . . . as soon as practicable
suspend, revise, or rescind” it.250 He then announced that the
United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement, presumably pursuant to its withdrawal provisions, and would in the
meantime fail to implement it.251 By contrast, while Trump has
expressed skepticism of some major international commitments
that received the explicit approval of the Senate or Congress (such
as NAFTA and NATO), to date he has not triggered withdrawal
from these commitments.252
Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement illustrates to other nations just how fragile international commitments made by the executive branch without explicit congressional buy-in can be. Assuming that Trump’s decision to
withdraw is indeed carried out, one might wonder whether it will
credits for renewables, state and local climate-mitigation measures, or a substantial economic contraction, but prospects for this are far from clear. Indeed, it is not even clear that
the United States would succeed in meeting the NDC with the Clean Power Plan in place.
See Warren Cornwall, United States Will Miss Paris Climate Targets without Further Action, Study Finds (Science, Sept 26, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/3YM6-UN53.
249 West Virginia v Environmental Protection Agency, 136 S Ct 1000, 1000 (2016).
250 Executive Order 13783 § 4, 82 Fed Reg at 16095 (cited in note 163).
251 Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (cited in note 22).
252 See Ashley Parker, et al, ‘I Was All Set to Terminate’: Inside Trump’s Sudden Shift
on NAFTA (Wash Post, Apr 27, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2TLL-A5ZB; Jenna
Johnson, Trump on NATO: ‘I Said It Was Obsolete. It’s No Longer Obsolete.’ (Wash Post,
Apr 12, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/M3WY-JJL6.
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cause other nations to be unwilling to make such commitments
with the United States in the future. But while it should increase
their skepticism, it is unlikely to turn them off such commitments
entirely. For one thing, a commitment that receives the explicit
approval of Congress or the Senate will often be impossible to obtain, and other nations frequently will prefer an executive branch
commitment, with all its limits, to no commitment at all. Furthermore, even withdrawn executive branch commitments can leave
footprints that are followed by other institutional actors. The
courts will have power to review the Trump administration’s efforts to repeal the Clean Power Plan. And already many US cities
and some states have signaled their intention to reduce emissions
in compliance with the Paris Agreement despite Trump’s proposed withdrawal.253 For just as other institutional actors can
serve as checks on executive power in the making of international
commitments, so too can they check the effects of withdrawal.
***
Overall, the Paris Agreement demonstrates both the strength
and the fragility of the president’s power to choose. In order to
bypass the Senate or Congress at the approval stage, Obama
needed the nearly two hundred other countries at Paris to agree
to core US negotiating demands and for the EPA to conclude it
could and would issue various emissions-reducing regulations under its preexisting statutory authority. Yet the success of the
Paris Agreement has proved fragile at best. For the United States
to meet its commitments, Obama knew or should have known
that all of the following would be needed: the courts to uphold the
EPA’s regulations aimed at climate mitigation, the next administration to retain existing efforts aimed at the implementation of
the Paris Agreement, and Congress to eventually provide appropriations that further mitigation efforts outside the United
States.254 That Obama chose to accept the full force of these constraints rather than aim for specific legislative approval of the
253 Open Letter to the International Community and Parties to the Paris Agreement
from US State, Local, and Business Leaders (We Are Still In, June 5, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/EQM2-FWZ7 (containing the pledge of nine states and numerous cities
and counties “to continue to support climate action to meet the Paris Agreement”).
254 A lesser threshold would be needed for the United States to remain in the Paris
Agreement and make meaningful though inadequate efforts to comply with it. The Trump
administration could block even the achievement of this threshold, however, by withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement or potentially by impeding the efforts of
states like California that are pursuing emissions reductions.
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Paris Agreement is a signal of just how impossible it would have
been to get this approval. For those who believe that there is no
substitute for specific approval from the Senate or Congress, the
existence of an alternative set of constraints will be no consolation. But those who are concerned about both unconstrained presidential power and undue legislative gridlock should have reason
to value the current system.
CONCLUSION
US foreign policy depends heavily on international commitments made without the specific approval of the Senate or
Congress. This has long been true, but high-profile commitments
like the Iran deal and the Paris Agreement made this salient and
the subject of renewed scrutiny. The Obama administration’s bold
decisions to bypass the Senate and Congress appropriately invite
inquiry as to whether the president now has too much power in
this domain. This concern is an especially important one at the
start of a new administration whose actions on other fronts have
already triggered concerns about executive overreaching.
As this Article has shown, important checks on presidential
power remain with respect to the making of international commitments. But we will not see most of them if we look only at constitutional law and only at the process of domestic approval for
commitments. Instead, the checks are spread across strands of
law—constitutional, international, and administrative—and
across the negotiation, approval, and implementation of commitments. Institutionally, they exist not only through the classic constitutional actors on Capitol Hill, but also via international organizations, administrative agencies, and even sometimes US
states. The resulting web of checks is not perfect. In some places
it is too weak and in other places it is too strong. But overall it
does a good job of balancing the imperatives of US international
engagement with the need for constraints on presidential power.
Although this Article has focused on the making of international commitments, the approach taken here has implications for
foreign relations law more generally. Thinking about checks and
balances only from the perspective of constitutional law is like
looking for the keys under the lamppost. It is a natural choice but
not always the right one. The international landscape is increasingly shaped by legal order rather than anarchy, and administrative law more and more affects how the executive branch engages
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internationally. These changes matter for how power is allocated
and constrained in the practice of US foreign relations law.

